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ABSTRACT
The Royal Navy underwent, during this period, a complete
transformation in materiel, personnel and purpose. The scope of this
transformation was at least as great as that of the U. S. Navy in the
years from 1940-1960.
The Royal Navy metamorphosis was planned and executed by one
individual of extraordinary capacity and unusual personality, Admiral
Lord Fisher, who maintained highly centralized control of the whole
organization The record of this period presents an interesting
historical example of naval management.
This paper examines, in sbbreviated form, the accomplishments,
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The study of naval history has been one of the important sources
of education, as veil as one of the recreations of naval officers for
centuries. It is, therefore, natural in attempting to relate the sci-
ence of management to Sea Power to seek a historical ease in which a
n&vy of the past presents a picture of management in action* This is
particularly helpful at present since our om effort is so close at
hand and so large as to be hard to see in perspective.
A case with interesting management overtones appears in the Royal
Navy of England in the years from 1890 to 1910. During this period,
a revolution took olace in that service which rivalled, if not equalled
our own metamorphosis of 19^0 to 19**6.
The earlier period saw the introduction of destroyers, aircraft,
submarines, turbine engines, water tube boilers, long r^nge gunrery,
accurate gun fire control, oil fuel, and the battleship as we know
her. It saw the final passing of masts end sails from the naval scene.
At the end of the period, Great Britain was supreme at sea but for on©
major rival. The later period has seen the introduction of nuclear
power, jet aircraft, missiles both defensive and strategic, electronic
devices of all sorts, computer spplications, and a host of others.
During this period, the battleship passed from the scene* ,\t

the end of the period, the United States is supreme at sea, but for
one major rival.
It is evident that, in both cases, a revolution in technology
took place. Any such revolution requires effort in at least three
coordinated areas: the introduction of the technology as a -workable
fact; the provision of men and support facilities to operate the
technology; and the adjustment of strategic thought to make use of
the technology. Success in such a coordinated effort requires
effective management. It might be referred to as the management of
navies, rather than naval management.
The Royal Navy's effort differed slightly from our own, in that
the preparation of the revolution was largely lad, and the fruition
presided over, by one man, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of
Kilverstone. Fisher was one of the most violently controversial
individuals of his own or any other time. To this day, it is diffi-
cult to find an objective statement about him. The language is more
moderate; blame and praise have taken the place of vilification and
panegyric, but the controversy remains. Some of the writers inter-
est has been generated by the question of how such a man could have
led such an organization in the accomplishments which undeniably took
place.
Significance
The central position of a single individual of exceptional

ability and well defined characteristics, and the tmsller size of the
effort compared with those of later years, are important in drawing
from the history of this period examples of the management of a navy.
First, the source of different decisions and methods is readily identi-
fiable, and the success or failure of these decisions and methods is
relatively easily discerned* Second, the smaller size of the organi-
zation makes the association of cause and effect more simple and more
likely to be accurate.
From the management point of view, the opportunity is presented,
in a naval context, to weigh the advantages of rapid, one-man, ir-
revocable decision in the formulation of plans against the possibility
of errors which might be avoided by flexibility or assembling several
points of view. The merits of instant, swift and ruthless execution
of these plans despite opposition can be weighed against the attendant
problems of neglected side effects, unforeseen or inferior results, and
the discontent of individuals whose brushed-aside ideas may have had
some validity. The merits of 6wift analysis and resolution of courses
of action can be matched with the attendant possibility of neglecting
some possible alternatives or outcomes. In a broader sense, the
effects of tight centralization and the building up of a single in-
dispensable man can be discerned. Finally, the cost of ignoring
human factors and of ignoring communications which did not conform to
preconceived ideas or decisions, are evident.

The Royal Navy of the period may well have required the drastic
methods which were used to completely rebuild it in such a short time*
The relatively small accomplishments of other turn of the century re-
formers of the Navy, who tried more usual methods, indicate that there
was an enormous amount of inertia, dogmatism, and official obstruction
to be overcome* It seems quite clear that the drastic methods employed
were very important to the achievements which eventually resulted.
However, the service paid a heavy price in unity and senior officer
morale for these achievements. Whether this price might have been
reduced without diluting the results is open to question. The not in-
frequent episodes which suggest that Fisher sometimes goaded subordi-
nates and others to rage for no good reason, certainly indicate that
some of the ill-feeling was unnecessary and destructive of otherwise
good results. Possible alternatives of less shock effect are worth
keeping in mind when considering Fisher* s methods and decisions to-
gether with their results and consequences.
Purposes and Limitations of the Study
Management literature abounds in "case studies," and the use of
cases is a widely respected method of study and instruction. The
study of naval history, somewhat out of fashion today, is really a
direct ancestor of case study.
This paper is an effort to bridge the gap between the two methods.
It does not attempt a complete history of the Fisher era, but rather

to sketch the events considered most Important in the transformation
of the Royal Navy, and to provide a selection of critical incidents
indicative in some detail of the methods used and the results. The
fact that many of the achievements and most of the accompanying pro-
blems were functions of individuals fits the orientation of much of
the source material available.
The years 1890 to 1910 have been chosen because during these
years Fisher held a series of high appointments -which enabled him
to initiate, and largely complete, the action to bring to fruition
the changes -which he had planned in earlier years. It has been
necessary to exceed these limits in some cases, particularly in
discussing the results of the revolution, which were largely seen in
Worl War I. 1890 was selected as a starting point because it was the
year of Fisher's promotion to flag rank, normally accepted In any
service at any era as the opening of sn opportunity to bring matured
ideas to reality.
Admiral Fisher* s second period as First Sea Lord, in 191^-15*
has been omitted except for a few useful illustrations of methods.
This period, which was not particularly successful, is not charac-
teristic of the work for which he was best kno*n»the creation of a
new naval technology. Furthermore, at the age of 73» Fisher was far
from being at the height of his powers, and far from being the one-man
management system he had been in earlier years.

CHAPTER II
Review of the Literature
A. The events and personalities of the Royal Navy in this perioo
are extensively documented for three reasons. First, Fisher himself
was the most controversial individual ever to occupy s position as the
professional head of any major navy* Second, many of the officers who
served through that period left biographies as naval officers often >ie
,
These were particularly numerous and widely published because all of
them include World War I. The earlier portions without exception
discuss the "Fisher era" at more or less length. Third, the Royal
Navy of World War I was very much a Fisher creation. Therefore, most
studies of the leadership of that time go into the Fisher era in some
detail; even those which are quite superficial are led into the are?
because of his return as First Sea Lord in 1914-15*
This body of material divides logically into three categories:
(1) Royal Navy history in the period; (2) biographical material on
Fisher; and (3) other biographical material on personalities of the
time.
B. Royal Navy History of the Period . The definitive work in the
See bibliography. Works not reviewed specifically here five
annotated therein.

field is that of Professor Arthur J. Harder, of the University of Hsv
who has been kind enough to offer encouragement and some hints on bibli-
ography to the writer. He has covered the general history of the period
in two works: The Anatomy of British Sea Power : A History of British
Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era . 1880-1905 and From the Dread-
nought to Seapa Flow : Vol . I: The Road to War 1904-19: f» The later
volumes have not yet been published. A letter to the writer from
Professor Marder in September 1963, indicated there will eventually be
four in the series, rather than two as originally planned. These works
are the only om s encountered in th© ar©a 'hich are relatively rcodern,
thoroughly documented, and derived largely from manuscript, Royal Nevj-
archives, 8nd other oriraary material. They provide a path through the
maze of other material. While quite detailed, they are assembled with
precise regard for organization and chronology. Most of the material
published earlier had not been intended as history, was somewhat chaotic
chronologically, was largely biographical end made no pretensions toward
objectivity; in the opinion of the writer, it is only the work of Pro-
fessor Marder that permits the amateur to make sense of the ere.
The history of the ships of the period was not available con-
viently until the publication of Dr. Oscar Psrkes 1 British Battleships .
in 1956. This volume carries its sub.4«or, Crom I860 to 1950, and con-
tains an enormous amount of material, mostly taken from original ships'
folders in the Admiralty. These folders contained the preliminary

sketches as well as other »4:lr> rellaneous materials on the desirn*, c >v
therefore reflect the development of the ships quite well. A general
work of passing interest is Naval Admini strations . 1827-1892 * written
in 1897 by Sir John Briggs, a senior Admiralty civil servant. This
volume provided insight Into the Admiralty point of view, as opposed
to the fleet, in the »90»s and is interesting in the quite large
amount of progress shown during the mid-Victorian era in improving
the Royal Navy, vjhich prepared the soil for the Fisher reforms.
Briggs actually held his nosition, which involved daily contact with
the Board of Admiralty, from 1840 until 1892.
The standard Royal Navy historical works are not particularly
productive in connection with the Fisher period, since this history-
became submerged in importance by the first World War. Almost all
the work on the naval aspects of that conflict, of which there is
much, refers to the Fisher era as the scource of the instrument with
which the war was fought, but does not discuss the actual building up
of the Navy in sufficient detail for purposes of this study. As
mentioned earlier, the Fisher of 1914-15* a ?©d 72, who figures in
World War I when he returned as First Sea Lord, was by no means the
same man as 10 or 20 years before. Naturally, the history of World
War I is important in evaluating the results of the "Revolution."
The Admiralty official history, Naval Operations , and Admiral
Jellicoe's three volumes, The Grand Fleet . The Crisis of the Kaval

War , end ^he Submarine Perils give the »r>arty line.* As an antidote,
two interesting recent critical works on World War I sre Admiral Sir
Herbert Richmond's contemoorary diaries edited by Professor Harder as
Portrait of &n Admiral , and Captain 3. W. Roskill's The Strategy of
Sea Power . These two books are lumped together in this fashion
because of the marked similarity in the opinions expressed. This is
considered understandable. Roskill regards Richmond as one of the
more important naval historians, and has followed in his footsteps
into academic life at Cambridge University. Much of the pertinent
World War I material is derived from the naval biographical materia]
discussed later. Illuminating comments come from those who were
captains at that time, writing later during the latter '30*s when
there was no longer any reason to withhold opinions.
Also to be classed as Royal Navy history, and of considerable
importance, is the compilation published as The Fisher Papers by the
Navy Records Society in I960. Edited by LCDR P. K. Kemp, the Admi-
ralty historian, the first volume, which is so far the only one available,
covers the years 1904-06. The "papers" are mostly official and semi-
official papers and correspondence, such as the original "scheme,"
as presented to the Board in 1904, and the minutes of the committee
which worked up the Dreadnought designs. This material is helpful,
showing the reforms in a fully matured form, as they came to the
Admiralty and the service, replete with tables, diagrams, and

detailed reasoning. This places in perspective the impression of
headlong and unreasoning haste created by some of the correspondence,
and charged by some of the controversialists. Future students will
need to use this series along with Professor Harder* s works.
C. Fisher Biographical Material . The standard biography is by
Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon. This is a most comprehensive two volume
work, but can hardly be called entirely objective. This is logical,
because Eicon vas closely associated with Fisher for a number of ye?rs.
Professor harder has edited Lord Fi sherds correspondence in three
volumes, entitled Fear God and Dread Nought . This should be con-
sidered biographical in nature, in that quite comprehensive narrative
and explanatory material is included. Fisher himself left Memories
and Records . in 2 volumes, but this was written in 1919 and 1920,
when he was very elderly, resembles some of his more acid and vol-
canic correspondence, and is to be regarded as purely background
rather than basic material.
It may seem surprising that so little biographical work exists
on an individual whose importance is so widely conceded. The answer
is that his life was so bound up with the service that there was no
significant ast>ect not closely related to the Navy.
D. Navy Biographical Material . Another large body of materifil
is found in the biographies of naval officers. These are particularly
numerous in this period, for reasons already mentioned.
10

This biographical material is useful in a variety of wsys. First,
many, particularly those written since World War I, contain reflections
drawn from personal experience on the results of the Fisher revolution
and the effects, good and bad, on the service. Most of the earlier
works maintain a reticent silence on the controversial aspects, but,
those vritten after Fisher's death in 1920 are quite frank. Almost
all provide numerous illuminating episodes of Fisher 1 s methods and
more conspicious personal characteristics.
Those which were written by or about officers older than Fisher
also play some part. These books are almost the only source having
any vitality which give a picture of how the Royal Navy of the mid
and late Victorian era thought, acted, and lived. This is important
for two reasons. First, it provides the context in which the Fisher
revolution must be examined for understanding. Second, the accounts
given point out clearly the reasons that impelled those in opposition
to Fisher, and show the amount of initial work that preceded and
supported the reforms. It is easy to get the impression that Fisher
worked in a vacuum, as a solitary messiah, who provided a sudden
flash of revelation which illuminated a dark world. This impression
is dispelled by reading of the work and opinions of Fisher's seniors
and subordinates, which give shadings to a black and white scene.
That such material is still thought of in Ehgland as important his-
torical matter of popular interest is well illustrated by a work
11

published in I962, The Fleet that Jack Built * This book contains shor^
biographies of such individuals as Fisher, Jellicoe, Keyes, and other
well known flag officers, forming a short history of the Royal Navy
from early Victorian times until after World War I.
There are a very large number of these biographical works. Those
which are particularly pertinent are cited in footnotes. Others, con-
sulted at one time or another, are listed in the bibliography.
E. General Comment . The overall loyalties of many of the in-
dividuals involved in some of the controversies Z ed to an understandable
reluctance to publicize service quarrels. This means that most of the
material on this aspect of the subject is secondary. The only primary
source of such material, aside from Fisher* s correspondence and
Richmond^ diaries, are newspapers, correspondence, and Admiralty
meeting minutes. Such sources have been utilized, by Professor Marder
and others, but naturally most of these were not svailable, nor could
they have been effectively utilized within the time limits of this
study.
A conspicuous exception to the general reticence in the con-
temporary period is found in Lord Charles Beresford f s The Betrayal .
which he wrote in 19H» after his retirement from the active list in
I909. Some of the assertions of this book are briefly analysed in
the discussion of the Fi sher-Beresford controversy later in this
paper; it furnishes useful material on the side of the controversy
12

not covered in most of the other vorks available. The book is strongly
controversial, as might be inferred from the title. Charges of false-
hood are found on every page; the then current First Lord (Reginald
McKenna) is flatly called a liar by riQme on page Jl, It surpasses






The reader is first asked to consider the status of the Royal
Navy in 1890. For those unfamiliar with the period, this is de-
sirable to provide the context* The part that Fisher had played up
to then is also discussed in this portion, so far as it reflects on
the overall scene.
Thereafter the "Fisher reforms" themselves are discussed. The
arrangement of these sections is by chronological order of the intro-
duction of the main scheme; the origins and consequences in a number
of cases overlap both backwards and forwards, but this seems the
easiest way to preserve a semblance of order. The reforms themselves
are discussed only in sufficient detail to show what was accomplished
and the methods used, with suitable references for illustration.
Chapter XL discusses some of the major controversies, such as the
Fisher-Eeresford feud, which affected the service before World War I,
the nature and impact of which are not made fully clear in the chrono-
logical section. Chapter XII does the same for Fisher as a leader and
personality, drawing together and amplifying some points which appear
only by inference in the earlier narrative portion.
Chapter XIII deals with a few pertinent aspects of the performance
of the Royal Navy in World War I. No pretense is made of a broad evalu-
ation of this performance; years of profound study have been devoted
14

to this subject by much better qualified individuals. However, it is
appropriate to discuss some of the more controversial aspects of the
struggle which have been attributed to Fisher* s influence. That the
echoes of the arguments still persist is illustrated by the following
statement from a book published in 19^3:
For the blockade war which came, Fisher had not prepared; he
had starved the Navy of convoying overseas for the sake of
the Dreadnought; happily for him and for Britain, Germany had
almost equally lacked perception.
This is a statement both oversimplified and superficial, and yet
1
it is embodied in a definitive work of biography.
Some conclusions, both specific and abstract, are drawn in Chapter
HV.
Method of Study
This paper has resulted from organizing, filling gaps in, and
drawing specific references from, reading which has extended over a
considerable number of years. Naturally, a large amount of material
has been omitted which might contribute to a more complete understanding
of the period, but which is not directly related.
Chronology
A brief chronology of Lord Fishers career is provided in Appendix
I. Reference to it is suggested for orientation.
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No explanation of the details of organization of the Royal Navy
is included. Most phraseology and structure is clear from the con-
text, and many of the differences persist to this day and are fa-
2
miliar to most U. S. naval officers.
Note should be made, however, of the constitutional status of
the "Board," or Board of Admiralty, frequently referred to. This
remained substantially unchanged for j6j years, until April 1, 196^,
when the Admiralty ceased to be a cabinet department, becoming part
of an overall "Department of Defence." The Board consists of the
First. Lord, the head of the service, who is a civilian cabinet member;
the First Sea Lord, who is the professional head and senior officer of
the Navy, and the naval officers and civilians who head the principal
sections of the Admiralty. The exact positions represented on the
board have varied considerably. At the moment there are nine members;
in Fisher 1 s day there were five or six. While the First Lord is the
heed of the service, and responsible to the Cabinet and so to Parlia-
ment for the Navy's mission, the group of "Lords Commissioners for
Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral" have a collective
ck minor exception is the rank of Lieutenant Commander, which did
not exist until 191^» A Lieutenant of more than eight years seniority
wore 2-§ stripes, but an officer was a Lieutenant until promoted Com-
mander. A Lieutenant in comm?nd of his own ship was called "Lieutenant
and Commander" in official correspondence.
16

resnonsibility implied by their ancient title. This becomes important,
because while the First Lord is the head, with the First Sea Lord as
his principal professional adviser, all the members participate legally
in responsibility for the decisions; the First Lord»s and First Sea
Lord's positions have sometimes been referred to as "primus inter pares,
"
The members have the alternative, indeed the constitutional duty, of
resignation from their positions if they are unable to concur in a
decision. A threat by the Sea Lords to resign in a body, a by-no-
means unheard-cf event, is therefore a formal and perfectly correct
refusal of the professional members to concur in a decision of the
First lord or the Cabinet. This differs very much from our own con-
stitutional responsibilities; it is the result of extending the principle
of Parliamentary responsibility to a group instead of to an individual.
This point is explained at length because the tradition of collective
responsibility becomes important in understanding some of the events




The Royal gavg in 1890
A. General Comment
s
.-*- The Royal Navy in 1890 has been much
maligned. Pictured originally by Fisher and others interested in
reform snd later by other writers, as an organization of massive
inertia, populated by officers of profound ignorance, vast prejudice
and complete imperception, more study reveals that there were many
officers of intelligence, ambition, and high motivation to do the
best they could for their service
Changes were taking place and were continuing to take place, and
most administrations could point to some accomplishment which was a
considerable step forward.
The most important influence was the period of almost unbroken
peace which had lasted since 1815 . There had been numerous minor
"police action" scuffles, in China, Africa, and other places. The
largest of these had been the "river war" in Egypt, the second phase
of which did not end until 1898, but which commenced in 1882. The
vast majority of combat operations in this period took the form of
landing naval brigades of sailors, which were the forerunners of the
fleet marine force of our day. The result was two-fold. First, the
Sources: Lewis, The Navy of Britain : Parkes, British Battleships :




development of the Royal Navy as a force for major war had proceeded
in a vf cuum, with only the steps taken by other navies in the same
period as a source of outside stimulus. Second, the mission of the
Navy had developed largely into protection of trade, both seaborne
and ashore, in the less developed areas of the world. The situation
of the leaders of the service, no matter how enlightened, was a little
like that of Robert E. Lee when he claimed to have "learned everything
about commanding fifty United States dragoons and forgotten everything
else" during the 1850 , s. The only major combatant force of the Royal
Navy was the Mediterranean Fleet; the strategic reason for this was
a vague general view that the French fleet was based at Toulon, and
the Mediterranean was the key to Europe. While reasonably valid, this
idea had remained unchanged since the days of Nelson, and hardly stimu-
lated original thought.
The Crimean War had been fought by ships closely resembling those
of Nelson except for rudimentary steam engines; there had been no
naval fighting, although the shore bombardments conducted stimulated
some invention in the way of armor protection. The American Civil
War had proved the effectiveness of armor protection originally intro-
duced by the French in I858, against explosive shells; however, it was
not easy to see the applicability of the design of two entirely un-
seaworthy coast defense ships to the problems of a world-wide navy
and the open ocean.
19

There had been two recent "naval scares," the first in 18?8 over
war with Russia, and the second in 1885, caused by anxiety over con-
flict with France, Both situations had caused a flurry of action*
There was a realization that the Navy was not organized or equipped
for war and that the Admiralty had no effective means for organizing
or equipping the fleet. Lord Charles Beresford, then a captain, first
came to prominence in the second of these, when he submitted his
"confidential memorandum" of 1886, while a member of the Board of
Admiralty. It is unnecessary to quote this, but two results were the
preparation of war and mobilization plans in some detail for the first
time, and the passage of the Naval Defense Act of 1889, the first major
integrated shipbuilding program. While Beresford cannot by any means
be given sole credit for these steps, this episode illustrates two
things: that there were aggressive and forward thinking officers in
the service who were supported by their civilian superiors; and that
Beresford, at any rate in his younger days, was not wholly the un-
intelligent, obstructive intriguer he has often been labelled.
B. The Ships . As a consequence of design having developed in a
varuum, the ships were a most heterogeneous collection. Since the
first ironclad, HMS WARRIOR, completed in 1861, no more than 4, and
usually only one or two, ships of a class were built. There had been
wide variations in size, gun distribution, speed, armor, cruising
radius and all other characterists. Ship types in service regard
20

from HMS NILE, armed vdth four 1^.5 inch guns and six 6 jtoch, dis-
playing 13,000 tons and generally not unlike our own OREGON of
Spanish war days, back to the contemporaries of the WARRIOR, which
resembled nothing so much as a sailing frigate with iron plated sides.
In between were an enormous variety of "broadside" and "turret" ships.
The first homogeneous class of ships were the seven ROYAL 30VERIGN
type of the 1889 Naval Defense Act program, none of which had been
completed by 1890.
Masts and yards were still very much part of the naval scene.
The last seagoing battleship to carry a full rig was delivered to the
Navy in 1881. Square rig was retained for cruising shi-os on distant
stations until nearly the turn of the century, although the masts and
sails were removed from the battleships very soon after 1885» This
retention of a rig resulted not so much from resistance to change as
from doubts as to the wisdom of ships proceeding to distant parts of
the world without auxiliary power. The rigs were conceded to be a
useless encumbrance in combat. They were retained as an auxiliary
for cruising and a means of providing the crew with drill and exercise.
So far was this carried that INFLEXIBLE, completed in 1881, a most
advanced large turret ship and one of Fishers commands, was
equipped with a full rig which was intended to be removed on the
outbreak of war. To provide some persoective on this point, it
Farkes, British Battleships .
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<:.*;>- v"« not™) that not until i860 did the number of new atearashd
buill. for the merchant service in England exceed the number of sailir
shipr. > All heavy guns installed were nuzzle loading until 1886.
Breechloaders had been introduced in the »60»s, but after some diffi-
culties were done away with in 1868. The later heavy muzzle loaders
were hydraulically pointed and loaded and had a rate of fire compara1
to that of the breech loaders that replaced them, but were necessarilj
shorter, as they had to come inside the turrets to load. Calibers
v-tvied from 10 to l6.?5 inches, with ranges and rates of fire of all
sorts. The lighter guns were breechloaders by 1890, but the main
armament was still muzzle loaded in most ships.
An exaggerated idea of the useful life of ships carried over
from the days of the wooden walls resulted in government reluctance
to spend money for new shios. This, coiubined with an equal reluctance
for the public to see any reduction in the Navy List, signifying the
strength of the country, had resulted in the retention of old ships
indefinitely. Almost all the ships built since the days of the
WARRIOR in 1858 were still on the list, in active or reserve status.
Many had had masts removed, complete rebuilding and new machinery t
but it w^s not practical to install breech loading guns, so the
improvements were not significant compared with the cost.
^Lewis, The Navy of Britain , p. 253.
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It is in the ships themselves that we see the least efficient
part of the Royal Navy in 1890. Action required the education of the
public, Parliament, and the government. The Naval Defense Act of 1889
represented the beginning of much hard work and pressure from both
naval members and FLrst Lords of the various Boards of the Admiralty.
Almost every Board up to then could point to something accomplished,
but generally not in the area of replacing ships.
*»• The Officers . The officers of the service were a product
of both the social structure of their country at the time and the
environment of their service. It is appropriate to consider first the
sources from which they were drawn, and then their professional training
and promotion.
1« Sources . The officers were drawn from the upper levels of
the quite rigid class structure which existed in England. While the Anny,
because of their larger amount of home service, tended to draw those of
large fortune and very high social position, the Navy drew from the same
social stratum those with some inclination toward sea service. The
early age of entry tended to produce a highly indoctrinated and
professional group in the main, formed homogeneously from a common
background of upper class families. The phrase "officer and gentleman"
4
Michael Lewis, The Navy of England
2?

had such a real meaning as to pass unraentioned in general. Conduct of
personal and professional affairs in a gentlemanly manner was assumed.
This structure was perpetuated by the expense involved in putting a son
in the Navy. This was substantial even under the reformed scheme dis-
cussed in Chapter VI; a midshipman had cost his father about^1000 in
school fees and allowances by the time he went to sea, and an allowance
from home was expected by the Admiralty to supplement the pay of junior
officers. Private means, therefore, was essential to starting a naval
career. That these were relatively modest is indicated by the fact
that almost no officers were married below the rank of Commander.
What had started as a necessity because of low pay and long "commissions, n
or tours of 3 to 4 years on foreign stations, had become almost a custom
of the service.
The Ehgineer officers were a group apart. They were recruited fully
technically trained from the engineering colleges or the training programs
of the large engine-building firms, at a much later age (early 20*s).
Those who entered this sort of training were normally from a skilled
trade family background and a completely different social level. Their
technical essentiality was admitted, even admired, but their lower
and non-command status was taken as a matter of course.
%. H. Staith, A Yellow Admiral Remembers .
?M

2. Training . The "executive, H or line officers were entered at
an early, but somewhat varying age which averaged around 13 or 14.
They received about two years of almost entirely professional edu-
cation. They then went to sea as midshipmen for four to six years
of practical training, during which time their education in such
subjects as mathematics, mechanics, and navigation continued. It
was considered essential that this period contain some time in a ship
with masts and sails, since it ended with the examinations for pro-
motion to Sub-Ideutenant, which were in seamanship and largely directed
to masts and sails, the foundation of the seaman's art as then viewed.
For example, even H. H. Smith who entered the Navy as late as 1891,
retiring in 1935 as a Vice Admiral, and Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer/
who retired in 1939* were both sent to masted ships for their final
two years as midshipmen. This hurdle successfully surmounted, the
newly promoted Sub-Lieutenant came ashore for advanced courses in
professional subjects, which lasted a year. This course included techni-
cal subjects, such as gunnery and torpedo, but no engineering, other
than indoctrinatlonal. They then returned to sea.
At a later stage, as Lieutenants, the opportunity was presented
\Tice Admiral H. H. Smith, A Yellow Remembers .
?Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer, The Sea Heritage .
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to a number of selected officers to take courses qualifying them as
gunnery, torpedo, or navigational specialists, or what we would refer
to today as sub-specialists.
This completed the education of the vast bulk of the Royal Navy
officers of the period. One can readily see that the result would tend
to be an officer extremely well trained in his profession as it was viewed
by his immediate superior, from whom he gained most of his knowledge,and
possessing quite limited education along other lines. This naturally
tended to produce a certain distrust of brilliance in others, and a
tendency toward rigidity in the face of change.
3« Promotion . After promotion to Lieutenant, promotion was by
seniority. By 1890, "Selection" was in effect achieved to a consider-
able extent by deliberate continuous non-employment of the less well
qualified officers, who remained on half-pay and so could not be pro-
moted, and also by early promotion of officers whose performance was
distinguished in some specific episode or manner. The effects of
this system are seen in such cases as Beatty, Keyes, and Jellicoe a
few years later. The first became a Rear Admiral at just under
thirty-nine, as a result of being specially promoted for service in
the Nile campaign in 1898 and again for service in China in the Boxer
affair in 1901, which brought him to the rank of Captain. This was an
altogether exceptional case; Keyes and Jellicoe were both promoted to
Commander early, as a result of China service also, and thereafter pro-
moted by seniority in their turn. Although it had the merit of
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providing promotion as a result of combat performance, such a system
was bound to be highly erratic in operation; the average officer of
reasonably high ability was promoted strictly in his turn, passing
only those who had been unemployed over the prescribed period. An
enormous reform had taken place in 1864. The situation at that time
is best described by illustration. In 1841, the senior lieutenant
8 9
had last been promoted in 1778. In 1847, the figure was 1796.
Sir Erskine Child€rs,then First Lord, had been responsible for the
first retirement scheme, which swept away the enormous numbers of
old half-pay officers who would never be promoted or employed, and
stopped promotions by influence. The system in 1890 was working
smoothly and the service was expanding, so that while there were
exceptions, there was reasonable opportunity for the ambitious and
talented. The early entry and exclusively professional training
tended to reduce any tendency to leave the service for other pursuits,
This all seems strange to us, who have a forty-five year tra-
dition of selection. Even Fisher, however, shared the opinion of
his seniors that selection would cost more in morale than its worth,
and favored a large list to permit non-employment of the less
Briggs, Naval Adminlstration .
"Michael Lewis, The, Navy of Britain .
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qualified until they retired.
4. The picture presented by the large body of literature, which
has been very briefly summarized here, is of a homogeneous, highly
professional group, well, if narrowly, trained in their field. Their
loyalty was exemplary, and while not overworked by modern standards,
the vast majority were energetic. That such a training and life might
lead to limited imagination on the part of many, and advanced pro-
fessional thinking on the part of very few, is understandable. It
is also clear that the social structure of the Navy was such that
civil and diplomatic conduct towards one»s brother officers was a
strong norm.
D Enlisted Personnel . The enlisted personnel, or "lower deck"
in British parlance, were a long service group of professionals. This
in itself had been a reform introduced in the 1850* s, when it had re-
placed the signing on of crews for individual commissions, which had
been the practice since the earliest times, and is still the standard
merchant ship practice."* Except for this step, the change from the
"wooden walls" had not been great. Liberty was limited. A few
petty officers and exceptionally reliable men might be allowed ashore
every other day while in port. A man in the lowest class for reli-
ability in returning from leave might be allowed ashore only once in
11
Fisher Papers , p. 21
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three months. J Naturally, such a policy resulted in considerable
unauthorized absence. Salt provisions -when away from port were the
rule, refrigeration being a luxury in a few large ships. Bread,
rather than biscuit, and a knife and fork to replace the seaman's
clasp knife for eating purposes were still several years in the
future. The periods away from England were long and the family
allowance rudimentary. Discipline was extremely rigid and punishment
severe. The educational level was very low indeed, although illiteracy
was quite unusual. For all this hard life, the men as a whole ex-
hibited great loyalty to their service, their officers, and their
shipmates. Despite the great gulf which existed, their officers
respected them as individuals and as to their rights and privileges.
It was beginning to occur to some that the material available was
better than the use being made of it*
This idea was encouraged by the performance of the engineering
ratings, who were recruited already trained in their technical skills
from civilian life, and entered as petty officers. The performance of
this group was proving that a reliable and effective petty officer did
not require many years of iron discipline and shipboard knowledge as
a background.
The other ratings were trained ashore initially, and then in






the drills, which were more extensive by far then we now conduct and
are discussed in Section E below. A limited number were given special
gunnery training ashore to fit them as gun captains.
E. Training . To understand the training carried out, the intensity
of which varied, it is necessary to remember the circumstances of the
period. In the days of wooden ships success in battle depended on the
ability of the crew to maintain a rapid rate of fire and to maintain
the maneuverability of the ship under any circumstances. Accuracy of
aim was not particularly important at the 50-200 yard ranges employed.
It could produce significant results when employed, however; the loss
of USS CHESAPEAKE to HMS SHANNON in 1813 was at least partly due to the
earliest gunnery expert in the Royal Navy, Captain P. V. M. Broke of
SHANNON.14
Proficiency under the circumstances required good physical con-
dition of the men and a great deal of drill at handling the armament
and at "evolutions" or drills such as out torpedo nets, shifting yards
and so forth. Extensive target practice was not needed. In addition,
seamen for thousands of years, from the Greeks until the present day,
and in war or peace, have regarded a clean well-kept ship as highly
desirable. As everyone knows, this habit has sound roots; cleanliness
is essential for health under crowded conditions, and a well-kept
14
C. S. Forester, £he Age o£ Fighting Sail ,
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appearance is the outer evidence of good maintenance.
It is easy to see how these things can easily become en end in
themselves in periods of prolonged peace. Nothing h?d occurred to
provide a forceful indication that anything else was required, although
the increased range of the guns was beginning to arouse some interest
in more advanced gunnery exercises. The results of drills in those
days were clearly visible from outside the ship, so that competition
was intense. The cleanliness and sanitation of the ships was also
clearly visible. Since these two aspects were the measure of per-
formance, and of the efficiency of her Captain and Commander (Executive
Officer), the emphasis was bound to be in this direction.
The training of fleets as a whole was based on making the fleet
a perfectly responsive mechanism to the direction of the Admiral, with
the thought that once this was accomplished, tactics of any kind could
be employed. "Steam Tactics," therefore, "took the form of quadrille-
like movements carried out at equal speed in accordance with geometri-
cal diagrams in the signal book. These corybantic exercises, vhich
entirely ignored all questions of gunnery and torpedo fire. • . *+5
The actual state of readiness of the fleet in 1890 is difficult
to judge. The more popular point of view is that the lack of realistic
orientation toward war had created a state of affairs laughable in its
^Vice Admiral K. G. B. Dewar, The Navy From Within , quoted in
Harder, Road po War , p. 8.
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absurdity. This view was expressed by many officers writing shortly
after this period. Admiral Sir Percy Scott, "the father of modem
gunnejy, • Admiral K. G. B. Dewar ' and others have held the service
of the period ur> to ridicule for sins of omission which appear obvi-
18
ous today. The memoirs of even the more energetic, including Beetty,
describe what seems like a life of recreation and enjoyment with little
constructive professional activity. This point of view has been ac-
cepted by Professor Marder1^ and others.
The sweeping results achieved under the stimulus of Fisher, Scott,
and others, and the high ability of the officers trained in the school
who were the leaders of World War I, incline the writer to a more
moderate view. That the service at large did not have a clear idea ©f
a long range objective is undoubtedly a fact. However, the introduction
of steam, steel armor, and rifled guns had stimulated thought. The
avoidance of target practice mentioned by many20 which had prevailed
in the 70 , s and SO's was being discountenanced. As in the present
day, there was wide variation in policy from ship to ship, and fleet
to fleet. Smithes discussion of the subject seems to me to strike a
17
Dewar, 0£. cit.
Rear Admiral W. S. Chalmers, The Life and Letters of David Beatty .
^Marder, Road to War . Chap. II,
20




I don»t think we thought much about war with a big W. .. The
general tendency of our training was to make each ship and
each squadron efficient without considering how their units
should be used in time of war.
He and others emphasized that there was a large amount of gunnery
21
firing, if not under very realistic conditions. The picture con-
sidered fair by the writer is of a service of well meaning individuals,
without centralized doctrine or program- for guidance, but of good
quality; a fertile field for the growth of a new Navy which w*s about
to take place.
22
F Place in the National Life . A discussion of the 1890, or
the pre-World War I. Royal Navy is incomplete without a brief mention
of this subject. There was simultaneously public interest and ignorance
on the subject. There were a large number of naval and civilian writers
on the Navy, whose works sold readily and whose articles were eagerly
accepted by the editors of the day. Hurd, Thur afield, Stead, VJhite,
Spencc: , Jane, Pollen, Corbett and James, are a few of the well known
names. This popularity is readily understood as the descendant of
the tradition of the Napoleonic wars. A charge that the Navy was weak
21
Snith, 00. cit. , -pp* 50-55«
0022
Appropriate sources for this section are the works of some of
the writers, both books and periodicals. The political cartoons of
"Punch" in the period 1880-1910 are sn interesting example—a sub-
stantial fraction deal with the Navy.
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was always good parliamentary material, and. created great press inter-
est. The career of Beresford is perhaps the most conspicious example
of the parliamentary interest which could be generated* "Public
Apathy" towards reform or change, which was sometimes complained of,
was really great public confidence, born of the Napoleonic wars, and
fad by the fact that the Navy to support the world-wide empire was
far stronger than that of the nearest rival, which in 1890 was France.
This public view had considerable influence on policies at times, as
in the case of the resistance to removing old ships from the Navy List
mentioned earlier. No government could afford to have the Navy weaker,
i.e., smaller in numbers under their administration© A charge that
the Navy was weak, as well as producing the political and journalistic
capital, could produce, if at all provable, a major national panic;
that of 1909 was simply the last and largest of a series which went
back to the 1850 , s. The journalistic interest could be relied upon
to add fuel to any service controversy in much the same way that
journalistic interest in the Department of Defense sometimes does
in our day.
As one final piece of orientation, it may be mentioned that the
U. 3. Navy in 1890 had yet to complete an armored seagoing warship,
and had just begun construction of the "New Navy" with a few small
cruisers
.
G. Having reviewed in some detail the material with which Fisher was
to work, the next question is logically how the man himself emerged, how
he reached the position of power to take the steps discussed in Part II,




THE ROAD TO 1890 - FISHER AND THE NAVY
As mentioned in the introduction, Fisher* s promotion to Flag Rank
is the reason for taking 1890 as the start of the specific area to be
examined. However, it must not be supposed that no glimmerings of
progress had taken place before this, or that Fisher had not con-
tributed substantially. To preserve reasonable chronology, it is
necessary to go back a few years.
A. Fisher - Early Years . While interesting, it is a separate
subject to discuss the effects of Fisher* s early career on his person-
ality in later life. The chronology given in Appendix I indicates the
more important events and years. A few comments, however, are appropri-
ate. After entering the Navy in 18fft, his service in China in I856-6O
provided his first opportunity to demonstrate his outstanding all-around
performance. He came to the notice of both his Captain and the Commander-
in-Chief, and so gained by performance the friendship of authority which
was necessary for advancement at that period. His often repeated lines,
"I entered the Navy penniless, friendless, and forlorn. I have had to
fight like hell, and fighting like hell has made me what I am, H omits
the fact that he stayed friendless a very short time, since he soon
attracted notice and also was well liked by his contemporaries until
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ft much liter period* It will b© noted that each job he held was a
MplumM of the service of the time; in each he came to the attention
of authority by hie superior performance and so cerae to mind -when
2
•elections were made for progressively more important posts. For
example, his performance at the Gunnery School in HMS EXCELLENT in
I860 was suoh that he was appointed gunnery lieutenant of the new
WARRIOR, the first Royal Navy armored ship* An Admiral's. diary in
1873 records the brilliant impression which Commander Fisher made in
lecturing on torpedoes . He was presently promoted Captain and appointed
as second in command of the gunnery school. Consistently fine per*
femanee, both as an administrator and seaman in the mast and yard era,
together with an obvious talent for things technical! brought him in
1081 commend of HMS INFLEXIBLE, then the largest and most complicated
ship in the Navy* This was a genuine honor since he was still rela-
tively Junior on the list of captains^
The purpose of this sketch has been to emphasise that Fisher did
not spring forth full blown as a reformer* He was first of all an
extremely competent all-around naval officer. It is a measure of this
ability that he never served on half pay, except while on sick leave.
Bacon, ftJahep . Chap. II.
rarder, Road £& £§£, p» 15., and MjBfljJfl and Records .
^iaeon, JHahe*. Chap* III* Marder, Iteag Qod and Dnad Nought .

That is, his services were always in demand over those of a number of
h
other officers.
B. The Navy I860 - 1880 , A few of the earlier reforms in the
Navy have been briefly mentioned in the discussion of th© Royal Navy
in 1890, Aside from personnel reforms, and despite an ingrained con-
servatism that caused each step to take years, many technical advances
had been incorporated in the ships as they became available. Iron &nd
steel hulls were used for new construction of ships from -he 60 *s on.
Whitehead torpedoes, the ancestors of our own, had been adopted in the
?0 , s, largely by the efforts of Fisher while attached to the gunnery
and torpedo schools. Electricity appeared for interior lighting in the
design of INFLEXIBLE in the late ?0»s, and had been used for search-
lights before that. Turrets were introduced in the early 1860»s,
HMS CAPTAIN being the best known, but the only unsuccessful application
of this principle of mounting armament.
The heterogenity of ship design in this period has been mentioned;
this was largely brought about by constant experiments with size, gun
armament, armour protection, battery distribution and propulsion. If
these experiments never led to a logical conclusion, it must still be
remembered that the initiative was found to make them.
Ibid.
->0scar Parkes, British Battleships .
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In the administrative area, eside from the officer personnel
reforms, there had been a few accomplishments. The Royal Dockyards
came in for periodic overhaulings, and had become capable of reason-
able fleet support and construction of new ships at a fairly
competitive cost. As stated in the discussion of 1890, there is
considerable evidence that well intentioned men were doing their best.
That this was a somewhat uninspired best overall should not slight the
accomplishments of many individuals.
C. The Reformer Emerges - Fisher and the Navy. 1880 - 1890 . In
1881, Captain Fisher first appeared a radical innovator, the role in
which he was to achieve fame. Appointed to command HMS INFLEXIBLE,
which has been mentioned as the largest and most complicated ship in
the Navy, he viewed her unprecedented complexity as requiring a novel
approach. She strongly resembled a modern ship in having a large number
of watertight compartments, and much auxiliary machinery. All this was
completely strange to personnel trained on ships without compartments
and with hand worked guns and windlasses; the result was confusion
below during general quarters. Fisher developed ideas such as colored
compartment markings, very similar to what we use now, and concentrated
his drills on such things as ammunition handling, watertight closures
and gun loading. None of this could be seen from the outside, and the
sail drill on her peacetime brig rig suffered,, The resulting displeas
of the Commander-in-Chief alone would probably not have caused any
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modification of this policy, but the morale of the crew suffered. Fisher,
therefore, after completing his training for fighting the ship, shifted
to sail drill with greet success.
I mention this incident for three reasons: First, it is Fisher*
s
first appearance as a geniune originator, rather than as a highly ef-
fective performer; second, it shows the problems created by the overall
atmosphere; third, it demonstrates Fisher^s ability to adapt to a
superior, when unable to convince or circumvent him; this last was
important to his success in the future and is discussed further in the
section on his personal qualities. (Chapter XII)
When in 1883 Fisher became Captain of HMS EXCELLENT, after dis-
tinguishing hemself at the bombardment and capture of Alexandria in
1882, he completely changed the training routines, which had become
many years behind the times, emphasizing smooth bore muzzle loaders and
cutlass drills for the men. More important, he joined the agitation to
transfer the Navy»s weapons from the Army, who had supplied them since
the l?th century. In 1884, the situation in regard to guns and ordnance
of all sorts was chaotic. For example, the first breech loading main
battery guns adopted as a consequence of the THUNDERER accident, were
decided on in 1879* The complete design, despite the existence of
"Captain N. Penrose Fitzgerald RN, paper before the Royal United
Institution. Quoted in Parkes, British Battleships , p. 257. Smith,
A Yellow Admiral Remembers , contains the same story.
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many foreign breech loading guns of heavy caliber, was not available
until 1884. Numerous other instances, including serious delays in com-
pletion of new ships because of guns, indicated that the War Office was
behind in ordnance design and not particularly concerned about the Navy
requirements.' Fisher was appointed Director of Naval Ordnance in 1886.
He at once took up an inter-department committee report recommending the
transfer of the Ordnance supply 8nd design. By great persistence, he
succeeded in keeping the committee report alive in its wanderings through
government channels; a Cabinet decision was obtained and, although it
took until 1889 the change was made. This enabled the building pro-
o
gram of the 1890* s to proceed in an orderly manner. Although the chief
credit for this is normally given Fisher, it is worth noting that Briggs°
places it as one of the achievements of Mr. Forwood, a senior Admiralty
civil servant, without mention of Fisher. Briggs' book was written about
1895 before any controversy arose; this episode is of interest in showing
the gulf between the attitude of the civilian in the Admiralty and the
naval officers. Since Fisher* s efforts were noted and left on record
by Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister of the day, and the maker of the
7
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ultimate decision it seems that Fisher was in fact the spearhead of this
important step
Do With Chapters IV and V as an introduction, we are ready to enter
the more important section of the study. This is the 20 year period of
Fisher 1 s service as a Flag Officer, during which he gained world-wide
note as a revolutionary reformer and created turmoil in the service by
his method
s
The years of Fisher 1 s greatest impact divide logically into two
periods. First, 1890 to 1904, when he held a series of key appointments,
began a number of his reforms and matured his "Scheme." This period forms
Chapter VI. Second, 1904 to 1910, when, as First Sea Lord, he implemented
the sweeping changes which required the powers of that office for accomplish-




ASCENT TO POWER - 1890-1904
A. Admiral Superintendent. Portsmouth Dockyard 1890-1892 . Shortly-
after being promoted to Rear Admiral, Fisher was appointed Superintendent
of Portsmouth Dockyard. The Royal Dockyards of that, or any, day were
not noted for efficiency. The workers were permanent fixtures and there
was little incentive towards efficiency or speed in shipbuilding. It
was Fisher* s view that such methods, which had been tolerated over a
period of years, were tying up valuable plant capital and resulting in
completion of ships already obsolete. He undertook the task of speeding
up the building of HMS ROYAL SOVEREIGN. This ship went from launch to
completion in 15 months under his supervision, which was two thirds of
the corresponding time for other dockyard built ships of that class and
substantially less than the best commercial yard time. His basic ap-
proach, as stated by himself, was "...concentrating workmen on one ship
like a hive of bees and adopting piece-work to the utmost limit. b2
That there was considerably more than just organization involved is
illustrated by some of his typical methods of supervision. One im«
portant but chairbound official was informed that he could readily be
made available to fill a vacancy in the dockyard in Ceylon. Thereafter,
Parkes, British Battleships , p. ^5$.
Lord Fisher, Memories , p. 2??.
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he was never in his office and always at the building ways. Fisher took
care to prime himself with the names of individual workmen when visiting
the ship, so as to give a personal touch to his encouragement. Another
battleship had a main battery gun replaced, an operation which he thought
was inefficiently performed. He appeared the next time such a job was
started and seated himself to watch. The normal pace accelerated; the
visits of the Superintendent were normally short—however, as noon
approached, a table was brought and lunch was served. Eventually the
job was finished in four hours instead of the usual 2 days. As usual,
his methods were drastic; the complaint arose that all the other work
in the yard was being neglected. Again typically, he brushed aside
these objections as brought up by men of no vision, although it seems
logical that there might have been a basis for them.
Bo Controller and Third Sea Lord. 1892-7 . Fisher»s next move was
to the post at the Admiralty which carried the responsibility for
coordinating the Royal Navy*s ship design and construction as a whole.
His five years in this post were important, both at the time and later.
Two important changes in the Navy were initiated by Fisher in this
period; the first was the introduction of the sea-going destroyer.
This type, designed with high speed and heavier gun armament than the
Bacon, Fisher , p. 104-5*
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torpedo boat, was proposed by Mr. Alfred Yarrow, a veil knovn shipbuilder
and designer^ Fisher pushed the design, which was generally successful,
Qtid a large program was begun* ~ In instituting this program, Yarrow's
design was used as what would now be called a "contract design," or
guide for other shipbuilders, without consulting the originator.
This created quite a considerable fuss and Parliamentary inquiries were
made, but the practice was insisted on as essential to Admiralty progress
and efficiency* Fisher, as he usually did in such cases, took care to
restore good relations with Yarrow, being well aware of the essential
position of that firm.
The second major innovation was the water tube boiler. This develop-
ment was the first "typical" Fisher push. The water tube boiler, in
much the same form as it is now used, had just been developed, and was
strongly advocated by the Engineer in Chief of the Navy. The advantages
for naval purposes, light weight and flexibility at varying steaming
rates, were obvious and Fisher seized on this development in 1894.
There was serious Parliamentary opposition, partly instigated by those
members whose constituents were heavily committed to building the other
type of boiler • This became extremely acrimonious, but Fisher held on,
as did his successors, and the boiler was adopted. There were charges
that the development had been taken up prematurely, before satisfactory
designs had been worked out. Extensive boiler repairs were required on
4
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many of the early ships, -which lent support to this contention. On the
other hand, Fisher 1 s reply was always to the effect that the necessary
skills could never have developed had he not forced the pace. "Straining
at the gnat of perfection while swallowing the camel of unreadiness" was
his expression, often used in other similar situations.
During this period also, Fisher was prominent in one of the periodic
Navy scares, that of I893. The First Lord, Lord Spencer, and the First
Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, were both rather inarticulate,
although determined. The Liberal government of the day, under Gladestone,
refused to agree to the shipbuilding program considered essential by the
Board of Admiralty. The Board, Fisher acting as the primary spokesman
in the many meetings, refused to reduce the program and intended to
resign in a body, which would have created a Parliamentary crisis.
Eventually, the government backed down and agreed to present the program.
?
These collisions with politicians caused many people in high public
8
life to become greatly impressed with his personality and ability.
This naturally affected his future. It was also the beginning of his
life-long contempt for politicians. This was very marked indeed© He
Bacon, Fisher . Vol. 1, pp. 108-9, Parkes, British Battleships ,
^larder, Fear God and Dread Nought . Vol. 1, p. 101.
7Ibid . p. 102.
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described the liberal cabinet members in this instance as "frightened
rabbits." His ability to draw the support of his superiors, which is
discussed at greater length in Chapter XI3, shows very clearly in this
period. He served under Lord George Hamilton, Lord Spencer and Mr. Gosehen
as First Lords, and Admirals Hood, Hoskins and Richards as First Sea Lords.
Their opinions of him and his of them were very high indeed. Since he
did not, by any means, hold the power at this stage that he later did as
First Sea Lord, the accomplishments of the period are clear evidence of
his effectiveness in working with superiors.
It is amusing to note one minor item. HMS RENOWN was designed under
his supervision as Controller. Despite the fact that much of his fame
rested on the DREADNOUGHT design ten years later, RENOWN was considered
a quite unsatisfactory fighting ship when completed. He used her for a
flagship in the Mediterranean a few years later, but at whose instance
is not recorded.
C. Interim . From 1897 to 1899 * Fisher commanded the North American
station and then acted as British Naval delegate ta the Hague Peace
Conference. There were no specific accomplishments in this period which
are significant to this study. There are however, many anecdotes il-
lustrative of his characteristics and methods. Many report his
kindliness and consideration towards his more junior subordinates, his
very high standards of performance, and his drastic action when an
officer failed to meet his standard. At the Hague, he startled many
by his strongly expressed views on preserving peace by making war too
1*6

horrible to contemplate. At the same time, he took a realistic view
q
of the possibility of regulating war. He is quoted by Stead, one of
the better known naval journalists, as having said in one session:
The humanizing of Wart You might as well talk of humanizing
Hell I...Moderation in war is imbecility.^
Fisher* s thoughts were probably seldom as violent as his language, but
this is a typical sample. Since he had been sent to the Conference to
fight, his performance was considered effective. More important,
however, he gained considerable insight into future German naval in-
tentions.
D. 1899-1902 Mediterranean Command .12 Inmediately after the
Hague Conference, Fisher assumed command of the Mediterranean Fleet;
as mentioned earlier, this was the prize sea-going command of the Navy
at the time. By now the service was accustomed to a whirlwind of
energy whenever he took up a new appointment. In this case, there was
relatively little he could do in the way of changing either ships or
personnel. His efforts, energetic as usual, were directed towards
anything which might improve the readiness of the fleet for war. A
9
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brief catalog of the accomplishments of the fleet under his command -will
serve to give some idea of the breadth of his approach. These fall into
two categories—material/administration, and tactical/strategic*
Commencing as soon as he assumed command, Fisher entirely altered
the maneuvers carried out. These were now carefully planned in advance,
to evaluate definite ideas of strategy and combat tactics. The ideas wer©
worked up by a committee composed not of a few of the senior flag officers,
but of a few captains and a large number of commanders whom the Commander-
in-Chief thought might contribute, and were tried in model form beforehand.
Once the fleet could maneuver effectively, strategic schemes were tried,
and finally joint maneuvers with the Channel Fleet. This was a far cry
from the "steam tactics" of the past. A series of lectures were given
to the officers of the Fleet by Fisher himself. The subjects read much
like a war college curriculum. The effect of such a shift in orien-
tation and increase in activity on the officers of the fleet was
electrifying. The formation of the large body of younger officers who
supported and implemented his changes with enthusiasm dates from this
time.
In the individual ship area, the shift in emphasis was similar.
He instituted what would now be called operational readiness inspections,
during which every possible general drill was conducted in rapid suc-
cession to evaluate the state of training. By means of a series of
long high speed runs he placed heavy demands on the engineering departments
of the ships e "From a 12-knot fleet with numerous breakdowns, he made a
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15-knot fleet -without breakdowns," as lord Charles Beresford wrote in
his memoirs,, The high interest in naval gunnery was just beginning in
1899 » and Fisher insisted on the need for constant gunnery practice.
He also instituted competition in gunnery and long range firing, on
the theory that guns must be used at the ranges of which they were
capable* At this point it is appropriate to mention that the in-
dividual usually considered originator of the gunnery revolution in
the Navy was Captain Percy Scott, another individual of very strong
personality and decided opinions. Scott had recently broken all
records for gunnery by introducing his methods in two different cruisers.
Fisher, as in so many other cases, grasped hold of an idea and made it
effective by energetic and planned execution.
The methods used by Fisher are typical and are attested to by
volumes of anecdotes and stories. A Commander-in-Chief's staff of the
period consisted of no more than four officers, so the enormous amount
of detailed staff work in this program was done by Fisher himself. His
habit of rising at 4 AM caused some inconvenience but was one way of
keeping ahead. There are accounts of officers who failed to measure
up being removed from their stations and exiled to the far corners of
13
the world. He took care, however, to indicate his approval of good
work, such as by offering a prize for essays on tactics, and by giving





successful full-power fun. The thread which runs through all the an-
ecdotes is of an all-seeing eye who loosed thunderbolts when displeased
•
14
Smith mentions an occasion on which he was one of the few officers of
the deck in the fleet not reprimanded by signal for some omission or
other during one busy morning. However, despite the enormous volume
of detailed supervision, his correspondence shows him to have been
working constantly on such things as the founding of a naval war college,
various maneuvers to get the readiness for war of the Admiralty as a
whole improved, and changing the composition of the Mediterranean Fleet
to suit his view of the tense strategic situation surrounding the Boer
War. As everywhere in the correspondence, the germ of future decision is
visible In this instance, it is a stated need for fast ships built to
outclass any cruiser, joined with an emphasis on the importance of
speed in general. ^ That he was maturing his views on the Navy at
large in this period became clear when Lord Selborne, the First Lord,
visited the fleet in 1901. The impression made by Fisher's presentation
of his theories was apparently responsible for his later appointment as
First Sea Lord. One other series of episodes is both illustrative
of Fishers inability to tolerate senior subordinates whom he suspected
were not entirely loyal, and of significance to the future. They are
14
Ho Ho Smith, A Yellow Admiral Remembers , p. 164.
%arder, Fear God and Dread Nought . Vol. 1, Part 2, Chap. 1.
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Kempo ede Fisher* s Papers , p. xv.
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sometimes considered the beginning of his dispute with Admiral Lord
Charles Beresford. As will be discussed more fully later, Beresford
was an officer of unique character, well known and popular with the
press. He was appointed as second in command of the Mediterranean
half a year after Fisher took command. This event was followed by a
number of press comments on Beresford'
s
steps to reorganize and im-
prove the efficiency of the fleet. This aroused in Fisher a deep
suspicion that Beresford himself was feeding this view to the press.
Although at this period Beresford acted as his subordinate with
exemplary outward loyalty, there was considerable friction. The best
known of several scenes took place when Beresford's flag-captain made
a poor job of moving the flag-ship in the Grand Harbor of Malta.
Fisher signalled, "Your flagship is to proceed to sea and come in
17
again in a seamanlike manner,** a most unusual public rebuke to his
senior subordinate. One other signal illustrates his habitual violence.
Smith quotes this sequel to a drill:
The yeoman of signals of the i s to be immediately disrated...
Sub-Lieutenant i s to be informed from me that on this occasion
he seems merely to have acted the part of the harmless imbecile.
But despite these problems, he had fired the imagination of the
younger officers and men and gained a loyal following which was im-
18
portant to the success of his later efforts.
'Smith, A Yellow Admiral Remembers . p. 150.
18Marder, Road to War , p. 12.
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It appears that by late 1901, Fisher believed that his consistent
goading of the Admiralty had ended any possibility of further important
posts* He expressed pleasure and some surprise when asked by Selborne
19
to join the Board as Second Sea Lord in 1902, The Second Sea Lord
was responsible for the personnel of the Navy as a whole. Fisher 1 s
interests in this field were officerprocurement and the training and
general living and working conditions of the "lower deck." In the
action he took, he first began to have a strong impact on the Navy
as a whole which affected each individual.
Eo 1902-? The Selborne Plan . Fisher's appointment as Second Sea
Lord, had clearly resulted from Lord Selborne's wish to have Fisher*
s
ideas put into effect and Fisher* s own desire to implement it in person.
As a full admiral he relieved a rear admiral in a billet which was
normally held by an officer of that rank. The action taken seems
logical to a modern view, but the situation in regard to officer
sources discussed in Chapter IV must be kept in mind. Much of the
controversy over them arose later when all the products of his reforms
came under fire.
1. The Situation . As will be remembered from the review of
the Navy in 1890 (Chapter IV), executive (line) officers were entered
as Cadets at about 14 to 15» for about two years of training in a
1Q7Bacon, Fisher . Vol. 1, p. 155*
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stationary training ship, and received the rest of their educetion at
sea as midshipmen, until they became sub-lieutenants at about 20. The
effect of very little education outside professional subjects from that
age has been mentioned; in addition, the standards of selection of cadets
were sufficiently rigid and competitive so that specialized preparatory
schools ("Crammers") had come to be considered essential, just as they
were in our own services in the •30s, The result was that these officers
actually received almost no non-professional education above the ele-
mentary level. Furthermore, the experience of the "crammer" left them
with a marked distaste for academics, which many never lost.
In I896, an effort towards remedying this situation had been made
by raising the age of entry and shortening the course. This, as
Selbornc founc encountered opposition from the schools, who did not
wish to lose their best boys just when they were assuming positions of
leadership. The decision had also been made to build a new training
establishment ashore at Dartmouth, to provide better facilities. This
was nearing completion in 1902, The training of the executive officers
contained very limited indoctrination in engineering. The engineering
officers entry has been discussed in Chapter IV.
2. The Revised Officer Education , Fisher held firm views of
long standing as to what was required. First, he deplored the system
of "cramming" and the narrowly professional education, which he felt
to be destructive of intellectual qualities. Second, and equally im-
portant, he believed that all officers should be trained in
5?

engineering, and that engineers and executive officers should be drawn
2.0
from the same source and trained alike. His reasoning proceeded
directly from the era of masts and yards—the ship in battle and the
means of propulsion were one entity and must be learned as such. To
us, accustomed to officers trained initially as engineers, this seems
highly logical. A moment , s reflection on the source and status of the
engineers of that day will bring clearly to mind the enormity of such
a change in 1902.
To achieve these ends, Fisher proposed a complete new entry system.
Boys were to enter as cadets for all the branches at 12 to 13 and remain
at the "college" for four years, receiving a general education, con~
taining basic engineering. Their training would continue identical
until they went to their sub-lieutenanVs courses; thereafter they
would specialize in the branches; the amalgamation of the branches
was still some way In the future. He was unable to remedy the fact
that to train an officer for the service still cost his parents ebout
£ 1000, although he complained of the undesirability of the situation.
As a step towards improving the motivation of the "lower deck," he
requested Selborne to include a provision for appointment of 50 warrant
officers a year as lieutenants.22
20
He also included Marine officers in this plan. This never attained
the importance of the rest of the scheme and shortly disappeared.
21
Bacon, Fisher. Vol. 1, p. 201.
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The implementation of this scheme called for some rapid rearrange-
ments because of the more than doubled number of cadets. The Naval
College at Dartmouth was rushed to completion and used for the senior
half. The other half was to be accommodated at a new naval college at
Osborne, Queen Victoria's old summer residence, disused since her death
in 1901. The construction of this establishment and the organization
of a curriculum had to be carried out rapidly, since the first new
cadets would enter in the summer of 1903* Fisher* s methods showed his
0*5
usual executive hustle. Selborne and Fisher - had recruited in January
1903 a well kno-wn engineering professor, J. A. Ewing, as Director of
Naval Education. These three in turn recruited a headmaster for Osborne,
Cyril Ashford, from Harrow, one of the best known British "Public"
schools. This was a conspicious example of Fisher1 s usual readiness
to get the best expert help and to gain their support. Ewing and
Ashford (with much guidance from Fisher for which there is documentary
evidence) produced a curriculum which was extremely radical for those
days. They recognized the need for a good mixture of humanities with
science and engineering, to provide a sound general education, but pro-
vided the humanities by history, english and modern languages, rather
than the classics which were generally considered the basis at that
time*
23
Selborne was by no means a figurehead in this activity. His





The Osborne plant was completed between March and August 1903*
by a United States hotel contractor, whom Fisher discovered after being
told by the Admiralty builders that the job would take three years. *
The result shocked many, who complained it was unhealthy, but served
the purpose until 1921 when Dartmouth and Osborne were consolidated..
The first cadets reported at the end of August 1903
.
The use of Osborne was obtained from King Edward VII, whom 51sh©r
had known since the 1880' s. This was an early example of King Edward's
strong support of the Navy in general and Fisher in particular.
To supervise the initiation of the scheme, Fisher became Commander-
in-Chief, Portsmouth, the naval command having control of the 8rea, in
September 1903» The School was headed by Captain R. E. Wemyss, afterward
First Sea Lord (1918-19), who was well satisfied with the faculty and
naval staff. It is interesting to note that Wemyss, who was an im-
mensely wealthy officer of an old and aristocratic family, and who parted
sharply from Fisher on another issue a few years later, was and remained
25
an enthusiastic backer of the intent of the Selborne plan.
3« The Reaction and Effects . The initial reaction of both
public and service was favorable.
2k
Bacon, Fisher . Vol. 1, p. 203.
-fyemyss, Life and Letters , pp. 68-69.
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The South African War had just ended, having revealed major de-
ficiencies in all sections of the War Office and Army. Reform of the
armed forces was therefore popular in general. There was considerable
comment by the press on the magnitude and desirability of the changes.
Service reaction was generally based on an admission that a
knowledge of his propulsion plant was as necessary to an officer as a
knowledge of masts and sails had been, although not so valuable a training
in quick decision and self-reliance for an officer. The best il-
lustrations are the reactions of some senior officers who later disagreed
violently with most of his policies. Wemyss has been mentioned.
Beresford, who had been asked by a group to lead the opposition, stated
in 1902:
The executive has remained ignorant of one of the most important
parts of his profession, and the engineer has never received the
recognition to which the importance of his duties and responsibilities
entitle him. 2°
Beresford could also write to Fisher that:
In 20 years time Naval officers will wonder how a steam Navy could
possibly have been run...by an executive who knew nothing... of
steam or machine appliances. '
Admirals Sir Edward Seymour and Sir Edmund Freemantle ' approved the
26
Excerpt from press interview quoted in entirety in Bacon, Fisher .
Vol. 1, pp. 221-23.
27
Letter of Beresford, April 1903. Quoted in Marder, Road to War,
p. 30.
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' Seymour, t£v_ Naval Career and Travels . Both Freemantle and Seymour
were conspicious in opposing Fisher in 1907-10. See Fear God and Dread
Nought . Vol. ?, p. 2."
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scheme, the latter quoting Drake, "...the gentlemen to haul and draw
with the mariners." Even his later enemy, Admiral Sir Reginald Custance-"
concurred* Opposition grew gradually, receiving impetus from the agi-
tation over the rest of the Fisher policies, becoming most vocal in 1906
when Fisher proposed to remove all distinction of rank, title and
uniform between the two branches.
The loudest reaction was social; this would not be worth discussion
except that it was an important point at the time; it enraged Fisher
and provoked him to violent reply which did little to quiet the strife.
The social reaction was from three sources. First, Naval officers did
not wish to have the executive branch mixed with their social inferiors;
most would not admit this, but would state that parents would not send
their sons into the Navy if they were to be trained as 'mechanics" or
31
associate with those who were. Secondly, there were indeed families
and others in influential social circles who felt this way, and feared
that their sons and friends might be assigned as engineers.-" Fisher's
3°
volcanic reaction to this is seen in his correspondence for the period.
His description of "all the armies of blue blood and society" ranged
30J Letter of June 1907, Fear God and Dread Nought . Vol. 2, p. 13 0.
31J Bacon, Fisher . Vol. 1, p. 199.
32
Werayss to Fisher, no date, quoted in Marder, Road to War . Vol. 1,
p u 47
^-^Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought . Vol. 1, Part 2.
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against hira is amusing.
More reasonable (to our eyes) opposition came from some senior
officers and from experienced and respected administrators like Goschen. -*^
The main basis was that adequate training could not be given in both
engineering and the line functions, and that the officers would have
to specialize to be reasonably profound. They held that increased
specialization was required by the increasing complication of the ships
and machinery, rather than increased generalization.
The merits of the plan overall may be evaluated easily. First,
common training and engineering proficiency had been since I899, and
remains, the U. S. policy. It has been reasonably successful. Second,
the Fisher scheme exists today in the Royal Navy, substantially as he
35proposed it. As Jameson puts it, "...opposition bulldozed underground
during Fisher* s years of power, remained alive." After a series of
vicissitudes, including several swings of the pendulum both ways,
common entry and rank for engineering officers again became a fixture
in 195^» The Dartmouth Curriculum, though now shorter, remains based
on the same principle; fees at Dartmouth were abolished entirely in
1947, after many years of reduotion.
^Flrst Lord 1895-1900.
-^^William Jameson, The Fleet that Jack Built .
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F« Portsmouth - Sidelights * While Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth,
Fisher was involved in three relatively minor works of importance, either
then or in the future.
In very early 1904, he was appointed, apparently at the instance
of King Edward, to a three member committee of which Lord Esher was
chairman, on the reorganization of the War Office. This committee was
a product of the desire for thorough reorganization following the South
African War. This unusual assignment was an evident tribute to Fisher 1 s
recognized ability as an administrator and innovator. Two things emerged
from this committee which foreshadowed Fisher's methods as First Sea
Lord. First, he carefully kept the other members in the forefront,
recognizing that this was the only way to get any acceptance by the
Army, since he held no authority. Second, he observed the effectiveness
of Lord Esher* s insistence on instant execution of approved recommen-
dations, 36 This gave little time for organized doubt until the scheme
had at least been tried.
As Commander-in-Chief, he had under his command the First Submarine
Flotilla, attached for coast defense purposes. He became a strong
supporter of this type of ship after experience of the effectiveness
of this weapon in maneuvers and was also impressed by the senior officer
of the infant force, Captain Reginald Bacon.
?6
Bacon, Fisher . Vol. 1, p. 210, ff.
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Fisher also worked closely with W. H. Gard, the chief constructor
of the dockyard at Portsmouth. Since he was in the midst of putting
together "The Scheme," the next series of reforms to be discussed, he
needed skilled help in making the sketch designs for his sll -big-gun
ships o Gard provided a convert to the Fisher gospel in the Corps of
Naval Constructors also, which was important in the future of the designs.
G During his time as Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, Fisher was
well aware he was to be the next First Sea Lord, and was preparing his
plans in detail.
Until now, he had been presented with opportunities for overhauling
individual elements of the naval establishment. First the Gunnery School,
then the Ordnance establishment, then the Portsmouth Dockyard, the ship-
building program, the Mediterranean Fleet and finally the personnel of
the Navy had felt his innovation, and executive and administrative drive
toward efficiency. Now he was coming to a post which would permit him
to grasp every side of the Navy and bring it into conformance with his
o*m ideas of the requirements of one objective: "The strength of the
Fleet and its instant readiness for war." As he worked toward this
objective, he constantly strove to increase efficiency at all levels
so as to cut costs and gain more strength for the same or less funds.





FIRST SEA. LORD - 190^.1910
Introductory Note
Bacon, ' in introducing the portion of his book on Fishers period
as First Sea Lord, says it is impossible to deal chronologically with
2 ?
the many activities, Jameson stays closely chronological; Marder'
adopts a scheme which is chronological, but follows main threads to
their conclusions in the narrative with the correspondence, and a less
chronological and more subjective approach in The Road to War , Granted
complete liberty of action by this disagreement among authorities, the
writer has elected to first deal with the enlisted personnel reforms,
which were initiated by Fisher as Second Sea Lord and continued through
his administration. Next, the "Scheme" as presented in 1904, which
comprised the nucleus crew proposals, the scrapping of obsolete war-
ships, and the distribution of the Fleet, will be discussed, including
the main objections raised in succeeding years. The "Dreadnought"
design series follows in the same format. Brief notice will then be
taken of a number of reforms accomplished under Fisher which were not
Bacon, Fisher . Vol. 1, p. 225.
^Jameson, The Fleet that Jack Built .
3
Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought .
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seriously opposed, which were very definitely of a management nature,
and are of somewhat more importance than Bacon's "minor" classification
would imply • Thereafter, the most important of the controversies which
arose are covered in a little more detail than could conveniently be
fitted in the chapters on specific reforms. An araplificatory dis-
cussion of Flsher^s personality and working methods, bringing out a few





Fisher was most popular with the enlisted personnel of the Navy
throughout his career. His colorful personality, force and obvious
competence captured their imagination, but more than that, when he
attained the position to do so, he instigated a series of changes
which provided the skilled and highly motivated personnel who manned
the ships in World War I.
While Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, he made changes in the
system which reduced the time consumed in training gunnery personnel
and improved the effectiveness. Thereafter, as Second Sea Lord, snd
after 1904, as First Sea Lord, he pursued the welfare and training of
the men by means of committees of younger officers, who investigated
and recommended a wide range of changes.
In the training sphere, the schools of signalling and gunnery
were reorganized. The training of engineering ratings was completely
reorganized. Rather than recruiting artificers at high ratings from
ashore, a system of training young new entry men as artificers, and
bringing them up through the grades was introduced. The stokers
branch was drawn on for men who could be trained ' for warrant rank and
engine room artificers and stokers were provided with a path to warrant,
1
Chatfield, The Navy and Defense .
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and eventually commissioned, rank. This provided an orderly uniform
structure where each could see a road to advancement. The effect on
the engineering branch was highly beneficial in both motivation and
discipline. The program begui as part of the Selborne scheme, pro-
motions of warrant officers to lieutenant, was continued. This opening
of the road to advancement made recruitment of intelligent men easier,
and so made training of men to operate the complex equipment being
introduced less difficult.
The welfare area came in for considerable attention. Various
pay practices of an arbitrary nature were stopped. For example, the
allowances of men going to foreign stations were checked for a period
of one or two months so that the Treasury would not be short if the
2
man was killed and the news did not reach home promptly, a holdover
from the years before cable communication. This, of course, was a
hardship which fell entirely on the families of the men, and was
changed in 1905«
Matters of uniform, messing arrangements, food rations, cooking,
and berthing received equally thorough overhauling during Fisher 1 s
time as First Sea Lord, a process continued by Churchill in 1910
and 1911 as First Lord. The sailor got his knife and fork in 1904.
This was a period of great public interest in welfare in general in
England, and the Navy's emergence from the dark ages aroused enthusiasm.
2
Bacon, Fisher . Vol. 2, p. 13.
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One of the important changes which reflected a consciousness of
the changing human material was the modification of the Naval Discipline
Act in 1907* which brought the system of punishments and regulations up
to date
None of these steps aroused any serious controversy, although the
craft unions -which had supplied the engine room ratings were not pleased
by the training program. By the time he left office in 1909* Fisher
could write with accuracy:
What has passed unobserved is what I am most happy about during
my years at the Admiralty in what has been done for the Lower
Deck and I was looking forward to still rnore.^
A definite improvement in enlisted morale stemmed from the Fisher
era, which was important in the performance of 191^« An excellent in-
dicator is found in Staith»s account of the contrast between the amount
it
of unauthorized absence in I89I and 1913 » which amounted to a 90$
reductions
3
^Letter of June 1909 . Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought . Vol. 2.,
po 22o The punctuation of the quotation is as given.





A Introductory * "The Scheme, M which survives in its initial
and final forms in the Fisher Papers , was presented to Lord Selbome
and the Board as soon as Fisher took office in 1904. Although Selbom©
had written to him earlier in 1904, Fisher declined to reveal his plans
until he took office in October. "The Scheme," however, was substantially
complete..
This blueprint for action had been worked up by Fisher with the
assistance of a number of younger officers, such as Bacon, who formed
a "committee of five" to review the proposals. It comprised three
major reforms: the nucleus crew plan, the scrapping plan, and the
redistribution plan, all of which were closely interdependent. It
also included recommendations on the characteristics of future fighting
ships. The most important of these recommendations were for a battleship
and an armored cruiser of revolutionary type. After the modifications
of the committee on designs, they became the Dreadnought and battle
cruiser
o
"The Scheme" was first gone over, at Fisher , s insistence, by the
First Lord, then by members of the Board. This is typical ©f Fisher's
1 \
Po K. Kemp (ed.), The Fisher Papers, Vol. I is the primary sourci
for this chapter.
Correspondence of July and August 1904. Marder, Fear God ane
read Nought. Vol. I, pp. 320-21.
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use of committees, to lend weight to bis conclusions md t© preserve
a sense of participation. Fisher himself nominated the committee which
worked with him originally. It included Jackson, Jellicoe, Bacon,
Madden , and Henderson, who all became Admirals or Admirals of. the Fleet,
as well as Gard mentioned earlier and Alexander Grade of Fairfield, a
shipbuilder • This group elaborated the original paper into an immensely
detailed presentation for the consideration of the Board.
There was no doubt from the first what the policy of the Board
of Admiralty was to be, although Fisher was careful to ensure the other
members were cooperative. A quotation illustrates the language of the
scheme and his views as to changes:
So we must have no tinkering! No pandering to sentiment! No
regard for susceptibilities! No pity for anyone! We must be
ruthless, relentless and remorseless! And we must have The Scheme!
The Whole Scheme!! And Nothing But The Scheme! !l3
•
Bo The Nucleus Crew Proposal . Those ships not in commission and
required for service were, in 1904, organized as the Fleet Reserve and
the Dockyard Reserve. The Fleet Reserve, the larger part, was composed
of ships ready for service from a material point of view, while the
Dockyard Reserve were very old ships or those undergoing major repairs*
The Fleet Reserve ships had small "care and maintenanceH parties attached
^Introductory notes by Fisher. Fisher Papers , p. 19.
L




to keep them in efficient operating condition, and were counted as part
of the force available for war.
Since I889, occasional mobilizations of the reserve for maneuvers
had revealed important deficiencies. First, because of the number of
personnel absorbed by the growing fleet, the care and maintenance
parties had never been sufficient to do an effective job. Second, and
more important 9 the ships were manned at mobilization by crews from the
Naval Barracks , schools and reserve personnel, who were entirely un-
familiar with the ships and largely unfamiliar with their jobs. Ma-
neuvers had shown the gunnery of these ships to be very inferior; their
engineering performance was also bad.
The change proposed was to purify the Fleet Reserve by removal of
some ships which were not up to standard, and manning the Fleet Reserve
with two-fifths of their normal complement, including "all the special-
ists." In 1905* this meant engineers and a few gunnery and ship repair
ratings o A crew of this size would ensure proper maintenance, would be
able to take the ships to sea for limited periods, carry out limited
gunnery firings, and form a trained core for the ships company on
mobilization.
This proposal was a rather sweeping change in the methods of the
Navy 9 and obviously would increase the efficiency of the reserve. A
most significant point is brought out in the original proposal itself:
No more men above our present requirements need be entered, training
in nunnery and torpedo schools need not be interferred and a saving
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to the taxpayer effected **>
Successful accomplishment of this feat naturally required much more
efficient use of personnel* This increased efficiency was to be attained
by reducing the number of ships in full commission, scrapping many of
the ancient reserve ships requiring maintenance, the redistribution of
the fleet and elimination of small ships on foreign stations. The basis
was elimination of ships not effective for war purposes. The scrapping
and redistribution policies are discussed in detail later; they are
mentioned here because of the integrated nature of the entire "Scheme."
Before leaving the "Fisher Papers" discussion of the nucleus crew
scheme, another point in personnel management is of interest. The de-
tailed calculations indicated that the extra enlisted men provided by
the proposed fleet changes would be absorbed shortly by the nucleus
crews and new construction, but that there would be a surplus of officers.
This is logical, since small ships have always carried a greater pro-
portion of officers* The difference was more marked in 1904. Fisher 1 s
comment
:
This will materially assist in the establishment of the principle
so necessary to efficiency of having large lists to select from
instead of having to employ anybody we possess, whether good or
bad, in order to man our ships.
Objectively, the nucleus crew scheme seems to have been successful
in a large degree* Those who were part of the service at the time
Fisher Papers. pp 9 4?-8,
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generally viewed it with favor as an overall improvement in readiness.
There are numerous comments on the amount of hard work involved for the
nucleus crews themselves, which are undoubtedly correct if our own
experiences in short-handed ships after World War II are any gauge.
Smith comments:
It taught both the officers and men of the Royal Navy that they
could do far more work than they had previously considered
within their capabilities •"
Naturally, there was considerable pressure from on high to be sure that
the nucleus crew ships were efficient. The plan continued until the
First World War substantially unmodified and was part of that mobili-
zation.
There were a number of charges levelled at the scheme, primarily
by those who could not agree that an efficient nucleus crew battleship
was wcrth the sacrifice of a Hprotectedn cruiser in commission. The
efficiency of the nucleus crew ships was the primary target.
By 1906, Balfour stated that the nucleus crew policy had "augmented
the fighting power of the British Fleet not once or twice, but threefold."
However, in 1906, the step was taken of counting the nucleus crew ships
as a primary part of the new "Home Fleet," which provided the defense
Smith, A Yellow Admiral Remembers
, p e 203*
7
'A "protected" cruiser was something of the type of HMS BRILLANT,
built in I893, 314 ft. long, 3400 tons and about 18 knots speed. She was
still in existence in 1919 and is an example of the more effective ships
of the class
«
Ao Je Balfour, quotation in Marder, Road to War , p. 38.
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of the British Isles when the Channel Fleet was absent, as is discussed
later o Beresford $ by then in command of the Channel Fleet, characterised,
it as "a fraud upon the public and a danger to the empire," and stated
that Germany could "inflict most crushing reverses. ©.in the present
totally unprepared state of the Home and Channel Fleets..."" The
effort to attain maximum readiness -without expanding personnel had been
carried beyond the point where it was considered safe by many critics*,
It is somewhat difficult to discuss the three elements of the
"Scheme" individually. Some of the arguments over those elements are
not clearly related to any individual measure. However, an effort has
been made to distribute the arguments throughout the chapter in a
logical association, and to deal with those not clearly associated in a
later chapters
C. Scrapping; Policy © As mentioned earlier, to make better use of
personnel, it was essential to employ them in the most efficient manner.
This did not include their use in small gunboats on police duties "able
neither to fight nor run away©" Aside from the gunboats, in Fisher's
view, Third Class Cruisers could be replaced on distant stations at the
rate of 2 or 3 to 1 by First Class Cruisers, effecting further econo-
mies o Fisher»s concern was two-fold* He wished to utilize the
9
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©
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personnel for the nucleus crews, but he also feared the loss of large
numbers of trained personnel at the outbreak of war, if these weak and
scattered ships were attacked by modern enemy ships • He also firmly
pointed out the loss of training involved in having men attached to small
isolated units, a problem by no means solved even today.
A second group of ships which he attacked were the Dockyard Reserve.
Many of these were immensely old, since the concept of the life of a ship
in the days of "wooden walls," when fifty years was normal, still held.
For example, MONARCH, laid down in 1866, was still on the Navy List;
she had even completed extensive rebuilding and re-engineing in IB97.
Her armament remained the same muzzle loading guns. Parkes mentions
that there were thirty=eight ships with muzzle loading guns still on
11
the List in 1903* Fisher contended, with evident justice, that these
ships cost money in minor repairs and berthing space, even when the
Admiralty did not succumb to the temptation to "modernize" them. As
mentioned in the discussion of the Navy in 1890, this modernization
continued until Fisher's time as Controller and was often very ex-
tensive, MONARCH had been fitted with modern triple expansion engines
which enabled her to make 3/4 of a knot more than when new, while
her fighting capabilities, that is her armament and armor, were totally
obsolete It is difficult for us to understand the reasoning which led
1:LParkes, British Battleships . p c 135c
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to such action, until we consider that most officials outside the Navy
had no idea of the changes which had taken place in technology and




The proposed remedy was simple in the ,xtreme« The "Scheme"
contained a listing ©f "bonafide fighting vessels," and three other
lists: "of doubtful value" "utterly useless for fighting purposes" and
"absolutely obsolete,. " There were 130 ships in the first, and 278 ship??
in the last three categorieso Various dispositions were proposed for
the latter categories, including use for subsidiary purposes, but the
whole 278 were to be removed from the Navy IAst, and the vast majority
sold or scrapped o This scheme was worked out in great detail including
provisions for the various subsidiary jobs, such as fishery protection,
surveying, training,, by a variety of means*. The basic principle was
stated in the comment on ship types:
Snail mercantile vessels, furnished with a Ma>im gun, a white ensign,
and a retired naval officer will be enough for the consuls and peace
police duties o^3
There was to be no new construction except battleships, heavy armored
cruisers, destroyers and submarines, all except the last being of superior
armament and speed to anything yet seem
14
Fred T . Jane, the founder and editor of the well known reference
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Fisher Papers,, pp<> 13-15°
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book, had been abetting this proposal for several years 9 by omitting
most of the obsolete ships and listing the old and small patrol vessels
as "of no fighting value " This was an effort by an ardent navy "booster"
to accustom the public to the idea that an enormous Navy List did not
necessarily mean great p©wer
Lord Selborne and the Board demurred somewhat and some of the old
battleships»-"of great value after Armageddon" ~-were retained as a
second line A number of small cruisers were retained also pending
the completion of armored cruisers « Eventually y a total of 15^ ships
were removed from the Navy List in one sweep
•
VJhen this portion of the scheme became public 9 it raised the first
major public outcry against the Fisher administration 9 extending through
1906 and 1907 until submerged in some of the later controversies. The
arguments fell into several categories u
First, the Foreign and Colonial Offices felt that the disappearance
of the numbers of small warships did damage to the world-wide interests
of the empire o They did not consider the substitution of "an armored
cruiser squadron at the end of a telegraph wire for a gunboat under the
consul* s windoV^a proper trade The fact that in the Jamaica earth=
quake of 1907 » Uo So warships were first on the scene » and some similar
episodes, were seized on by a portion of the press and the public, with
"*A ..arginal note * Selbo™ in F^er P^.
^
^Fisher Papers, p c 380
75

the support of the Foreign *nd Colonial Offices as a "national disgrace."
There is little doubt that this opposition arose from a reluctance to
accept the change ©f role of the Navy from police force to a combatant
force aligned against the principal enemy o Fisher 9 s reaction was
scathing, and history bears him outo
A large number of naval officers had other criticism, however. One
was lack of ships to protect the trade routes o Fisher proposed to do
this in war time by powerful squadrons which could "lick up the enemy
cruisers like armadillos in an ant hiil„" He also held the view that
commerce raiding in the future would be by powerful squadrons* In this
point of view he proved to be substantially correct until the submarine
emerged, which was not foreseen until just before 1914 The damage done
by German surface raiders f while spectacular, was unimportant. However,
it was contended by a number of officers that light, or protected, as
they were then called, cruisers were needed for fleet duties of scouting
and patrol. It was also contended that large numbers of auxiliary and
support ships would be needed in time of war. Fisher* s view was that
destroyers could do the scouting and patrolling and that the subsidiary
duties were of no importance In both of these contentions he proved
quite wrong, although the policy as originally stated held throughout
his administration.; All the building programs after he left office con-
tained light cruisers in some numbers but World War I still found these
ships chronically short o
The main proponents of the opposite point of view in the professions!
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ranks \-?ere Admirals Bridge, Custe ice and Richards 9 All of these officers
had held high posts at the Admiralty 9 and all incurred Fisher* s undying
enmity* His correspondence and the quotations on the subject are acid©
The scrapping policy has been covered in a certain amount of detail
as it illustrates Fisher's sweeping methods and refusal to retreat from
a point of view that was in his opinion correcto He said of the four
types to be built , "No other type of vessel is required for fighting
purposes 9 "^° and this remained Admiralty policy until he left offices
It was, as mentioned earlier the first of the Fisher reforms to
provoke a real storm of criticism, both within and without the Navy.
His reaction to the criticism, as evidenced by his correspondence, was
violent
o
Do Fleet Distribution ,. ' The Fleet in 1904 remained deployed
substantially as in 1890; the main combatant strength was in the
Mediterranean, and battleships were kept on the foreign stations in
substantial quantities o However, the strategic picture had changed
sharply over the intervening years « Instead of France being the second
naval power in the world and the most likely enemy, Germany had assumed
this position., The Asiatic alignment had been sharply changed by the









but the problem had been considerably lessened by the "Entente" with
France.
The lise of Germany as a menace had been widely publicized and noted
in the few years since the German Navy had been building up strength.
First, there was a substantial commercial rivalry, particularly overseas.
Second, the German Navy was attaining a strength which could have no other
object than challenging British control in the North Sea. Third, Wilhela
H, notorious for his diplomatic indiscretions, had left no one in any
doubt of German feelings on the occasion of the Boer War which had just
endec o All of these developments had taken place in a glare of pub-
licity on both sides, parliamentary and press, which was of a belligerent
nature difficult to comprehend today when a general war is so universally
feared. The naval writers, mentioned earlier, were none of them backward
in pointing at Germany although official cabinet policy remained steadfastly
conciliatory. A collision was, by 1910, regarded as inevitable in the
Royal Navy and the German Fleet.
Fisher had clearly recognized the menace by 1900. His suspicion of
the Germans was extreme o He was in full sympathy with an article written
by Arnold White, a well known naval writer, in 1904 urging "Copenhagening,"
meaning a preventive attack on the German Fleet. Fisher himself is relia»
bly reported to have made such a proposal to King Edward on at least one
l ft
occasion, although how seriously he meant it is questioned.
18




The King # s reply is reported to have been, "Fisher, you* re Mad!"
Under the circumstances a concentration of the fleet in home waters
was an obvious step This became a keystone of Admiralty policy until
World War I, although care was taken to make the moves somewhat gradual,
so as to give Germany no official grounds for complaint* The first
step, in late 1904, reinforced the Home Fleet from eight to twelve
battleships o It was renamed the Channel Fleet, which historically
implied a cruising and possibly offensive role, and based in Dover and
Portland • The eight ships of the old Channel Fleet, renamed the Atlantic
Fleet, were replaced by the most modern available and based on Gilbraliar
so as to be readily available in either the Atlantic or Mediterranean.
The Mediterranean Fleet was reduced to eight battleships, despite doubts
as to Russians conduct in the Russo-Japanese War and the obligations of
Anglo-Japanese Treaty in case of intervention by a third party. These
were made more acute by the famous Russian error of firing on the British
fishing fleet on the Dogger Bank in 1904« In 1905* further concentration
in home waters was effected by bringing in the five battleships from the
China station, and consolidating the other distant stations with a view
to making their ships more effective for war G
Thus far, the only objections had arisen from much the same origins
as those discussed under the scrapping scheme: the reduced "police foice"
available at once world-wide • This outcry has been faily comprehensively
discussed under that heading c In 190?, however, a development took place
'Bacon, Fisher
,
Volo H, p» 75<
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in the controversy which is interesting; it was a reaction against economy,
in the shape of the nucleus crew ships place in the fleet, on the grounds
that security was being jeopardized
•
In late 1906, a further step in concentration in home waters had been
taken* A new Home Fleet was formed of one fully manned division of six
ships drawn from the other three main fleets $ and two nucleus crew di-
visions. These nucleus crew divisions were manned with three-fifths crews,
rather than two«fifths; a slight reduction in the number of ships in full
commission was required to do thiSo The Atlantic Fleet base was shifted
to Berehaven in western Irelando The Channel Fleet base was shifted
from Dover westward to Portland on the south coast • The fully manned
division of the Home Fleet was based on the Nore, at the mouth of the
Thames, with the ru ileus crew divisions at Portsmouth and Devenport on
the south coast* The motive was sound. The most effective and yet
flexible concentration could be made without drawing attention, since the
two extreme "wings" were fairly close together, at the Nore and Berehaven.
The best use could be made of the nucleus crew ships, proven by two years 1
experience to be effective, since they were now part of the combatant
fleet. Logistics were made easier and the ships were removed from Dover,
considered highly vulnerable to surprise attack and a poor harbor <> In
Fisher, s view, the effectiveness of the Fleet had been enhanced with a
reduction in costo
He had not foreseen* or disregarded, the general fear of Germany
which had grown up As Marder says* "The din of protests.was ear
shattering." The basis was originally the inability of the Home Fleet
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to stave off a German attack if one should come in the absence of the
Channel Fleet at sea in the Atlantic*, The fact that the Dreadnoughts
were being assigned to the Nore division as completed, passed more or
less unnoticed©
Quite shortly the whole storm became one with the arguments over
the scrapping policy; it had not died down before the Naval Scare of
1909 began
Many of the charges levelled against Fisher* s efforts toward
economizing while building strength which have been discussed in this
chapter are well summarized in the following paragraph, from a letter
20
from Lord Hardinge, then in the Foreign Office:
It is perfectly childish to expect sane people to believe that ships
with nucleus crews lying in home ports can be regarded as efficient
items in a fleet 9 and he has failed to prove that the reductions in
our fleets in commission have not reduced our fighting strength*
Also, it can hardly be denied that the ships available for police
duties abroad will suffer for the sake of concentration in the
channel against a possible attack by Germany which even Fisher regards
as a very remote eventuality • The only explanation of the scheme is
economy and Fisher 1 s desire to truckle to the Liberal Party.
The illogicalities present in this letter are typical of statememts
which provoked Fisher to violent outbursts in letters and sometimes in
public.
E. "The Scheme" also included suggested ship types, whose character-
istics were given in general terms o The development of these types,
20
Marder, Road to War, p 73°
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Fisher's best-rewaabered innovation $ was pursued concurrently with the
other changes o The detailed design proposals did not form part of the
original document , although usually considered part of the "Scheme."




THE DREADNOUGHT DESIGN SERIES1
A. First Proposals o The most important of the general proposals
for new designs was far a battleship of increased size and speed* with
a uniform large caliber gun armament and having a number of other novel
features*. This was accompanied by a proposal for an armored cruiser of
high speed, larger than the battleship^ and also carrying a heavy unif©k*<
araamente The destroyer to accompany these ships was an equivalent ad-
vance, being 5 knots faster^, 50 feet longer and 75$ larger in displacement
2
than previous ships of this typeo ' The destroyer had emere-ed from the
torpedo boat type during Fi sherds time as Controller, as mentioned
earlier.
All these proposals had certain things in common; they were larger,
faster, and more heavily gunned than their foreign equivalents* Fisher
wanted to adopt oil fuel for all 9 because of the well known advantages
in efficiency, stowage and reduction of personnelo He was unable to
do this except in the destroyers because there was no assured supply
of oil for the fleet in wartime <> The attitude in 1905 towards oil fuel
is interestingly pointed out by one of Lord 3elbome*s marginal notes,
itemp* Fisher Papers; Pas*kes
v British Battleships^ main sourer.
2
H. M LeFlemings Warships of World War I.
-TCemp, ojn. cit „ p» 81 „
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The substitution of oil for coal is impossible because oil does no?:
exist in the world in sufficient quantities o It must be reckoned
only as a most valuable adjuncto
In the end, the heavy ships were equipped with mixed firing, so that they
could use either or both, while the destroyers burned oil.
Bo "DREADNOUGHT," The origin of the all big-gun battleship is
a fascinating study which has produced a number of full length -papers
in itself o It is sufficient to say here that the concept did not sprinp
full blown from Fisher* s mindo His experiences with his gunnery trials
in the Mediterranean, and considerations of the requirements of war, as
opposed to peacetime gunnery practice^ had convinced him of the difficulties
of controlling the fire of a mixed caliber armament <, In the 1903 edition
of Janes 1 ,* to which the writer was led by Parkes* reference, Cuniberti,
a well known Italian warship designer^ proposed an all big-gun battleship
of 29 knot speed as "the ideal ship for the British Navy." The United
States in 1904 had designed the Michigan class with &n armament of
eight 12-inch guns,^ but quite moderate size and speed.
The original proposal mentioned alternatives between 10-inch guns,
of which more could be carried and which had a higher rate of fire, and
the 12-incho The Russo-Japanese War, the observers* reports of which
became available in the summer of 1905$ produced two important inputs
to the problem It confirmed the effectiveness of the 12-inch gun, and
4
Fred To Jane, All The World's Fighting Shi&s, 1903 edition.
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the probability of long range actiono The Japanese secondary armament .5.
„
their battleships being equipped with 12-inch, 8«4neh and 6-inch guns,
did not come into effective action until the Russian Fleet was on its
way to defeats. The major damage was done by the 12»inch shells
•
This settled the argument in Fisher 9 s mind, and on his taking over
the Admiralty, he set a particularly notable committee to work on the
design* This committee was appointed by the Board of Admiralty. Its
membership was deliberately chosen to represent a cross section of the
Admiralty and the shipbuilding industry and to be sufficiently illustrious
to set possible criticisms at rest* This committee is an excellent ex~
ample of a practice which Fisher frequently adopted; examples are the
Selborne plan, the Engineering offices changes, and so forth. It is
some evidence both of his personal charm and magnetism when he wanted
to exert it, the force of his reasoning and presentation, the awe in which
he was held by naval officers, and his ability to get important civilians
to do as he wished, that there is no record of a committee he formed
coming to a conclusion other then that which he intended to be attained,
with detailed support for the positiono
Although many of the members had more detailed ideas and knowledge
already, the precept given the committee was in substance only the
following
:
Tlembership listed in Appendix II,
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Battleship: 21 knots speed, l?-inch guns and anti-torpedo craft
guns. No intermediate armament and as many 12-inch as possible.
Adequate armor • To be able to use the 4 larger drydocks.
Armored Cruiser: 25 knots speed . Same arnamen:, but 12-inch
guns to be reduced in number as necessary to ktsp the size within
reasonable limits ?
The deliberations of the committee are most interesting reading.
They were carried out in great detail^, and include as appendices detailed
tactical studies as to the employment of a ship such as those under con-
sideration. They resulted in DREADNOUGHT, discussed hereunder, and
INVINCIBLE, discussed below in Section C« The destroyer designs mentioned
earlier were also considered by this committee.
The revolutionary nature of the resulting battleship is best under-
stood by comparing the design of the KING EDWARD VII class then completing,
which was considered the best standard battleship design in the world
at that time:"
KING EDWARD VII







10-6", 14-12 pdr (3 inch)
14-3 pdr
9" side, 12" turrets
DREADNOUGHT
21,845 tons (max. load)
**90» long, 32 • beam,
27 • draft
10-12", 27-12 pdr (3 inch)
11" side, 11" turrets
Fisher Papers
, p. 201.
Parkes, British Battleships ,
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KING EDWARD VII DREADNOUGHT
Engines: Triple expansion, Turbine, 4 shafts
reciprocating
2 shafts
Speed: 18 knots with 18,000 hp. 21 knots -with 23,000 hp.
Cost:9 £ 1,473,245 -% 1,797,497
It is readily apparent from this table that every major character-
istic of the ship was a major breakthrough In addition, there were
many other changes, such as much more watertight sub-division, anti-
torpedo protection, radically different hull lines, and the most
careful and detailed measures to reduce unnecessary weight and size*
She embodied, we can see from 1964, the features which marked every
superior design of the rest of the battleship era; higher speed, heavier
main armament, equal or superior protection, and a secondary armament
only sufficient to deal with the principal secondary enemy of the period.
The design proved eminently sound. The only change required until
1914, in a period of very rapid development, was the increas< , with the
increase in size of destroyers and range of torpedoes, of the secondary
battery, first to 4W and then to 6" guns Size increased as necessary
to accommodate progressively increasing main battery gun caliber.
Since details could obviously not be kept secret long, in order to
make use of such a radical increase in fighting power, it was essentia?
o
fisher Papers, p« 34l a
10e»g., IOWA, YAMATO classes* BI5KARK carried a secondary battery




that the prototype be rushed to completion and tested so that other
nations could not gain an advantage in numbers • Thereafter, the capacity
of the shipbuilding industry and the budget would suffice . DREADNOUGHT
was completed in one year or just over one-third the normal time. This
was done by radical management methods coordinated by Fisher himself.
These are interesting in themselves and sound very contemporary; two
will suffice for illustration: The main battery guns and mountings for
two pre-dreadnought ships under construction were appropriated c Material
was ordered from the steel mills in sizes and thicknesses required, rather
then being stocked and then sorted and cut in the yard.
Her trials were eminently successful • It is noticeable that, as
has often happened with radical ships, her few minor problems were
remedied with the least possible notice to the service or the public;
while she was indeed a successful ship, good care was taken that she
should appear so»
After the ship was completed in 1906, there was a large amount of
criticism, as might be expected of any such radical change introduced
under the aegis of one man in such a short time
Strategically, it was argued that by introducing such a design, the
overwhelming British strength in battleships had been made worthless
»
This ignored the fact that some nation was sure to produce such a ship
before long, as can be seen from the existence of the CUNIBERTI and
MICHIGAN designs
o
cfc Bacon, Fisher , Volo VI, p<, 266<
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Tactically, the discussion was store profound and involved a number
of officers of distinction, among them Admiral Mahan of the United States
(whom history has proven to be a strategist but not a tactician), Admiral
Custance,Sir William White, who was the ex-director of Naval Construction^
and others. These arguments questioned the value of superior speed, the
suppression of secondary batteries and the great size of the ships. Here
the Admiralty was in difficulties; they did not wish to release the
official interpretation of the results of the Russo-Japanese War as
embodied in their tactical thinking; they particularly did not wish to
release the battle practice results which demonstrated the superiority
of the 12" guns over the 9«2" in weights of hits per minute when both
were within range, despite the latter* s rapidity of fire e In the end,
the argument was allowed to run its course* It played a lesser part in
the later service dissension than some of the other problems.
The third argument was fiscalo The cost of the ship was objected
to in many quarters, mainly on the grounds that "many eggs were being
put in a large and expensive basket." The answer here was in the
better balance of protection and the greater number of guns per mile or
per pound sterling obtainable with a large ship* The actual issue of
cost was undercut as an argument by the completion of LORD NELSON and
AGAMMEMNON* two pre~dreadnought ships too far along to be altered
o
These worked out at~£ 1,616,000 each; their fighting power was obviously
lesso There was also argument over the expense of building larger




Professor Marder considers the introduction of the DREADNOUGHT as
a remarkable instance of genius, an opinion shared by a number of naval
12
officers well known as analysts of the period • The writer, viewing
the operation from within our own service some years later, considers
it not so much an exhibition of genius as an exhibition of management
and executive ability unsurpassed by any of our own recent programs
which share some of the characteristicso^
Co The Battle Cruiser « INVTNCIELEo The "armored cruiser" designs
produced by the committee had a similar background. The results created
less controversy at the time, probably because the first ship was not
completed until 1908, but have since been considered a failure largely
because of the battle performance of the type in both wars.
The ship produced was totally unlike anything which had gone before
•
Relevant particulars were:1
Size: 567 • long, 78 • beam, 27* draft
Displacement: 20,125 tons (max. load)
Guns: 8-12", 16-4"
Armor: 6" side, 7W turrets
Engines: turbines, 4 shafts
Speed: 25 knots
Cost: -£ 1,635*739
This is a ship of battleship size and cost, with a modified battleship
gun armament, cruiser protection and higher speed than any contemporary
12
Marder, Road to War, p 69
»
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In the future, say ten years, when full information can be released,
a parallel study of the DREADNOUGHT, the nuclear propulsion program and the




ship afloat except a destroyer • The concept was of a ship capable of
high speed over long di stances , with armament to cut down any cruiser.
At the same time, she was fast enough t© stay away from anything she
could not fight—thus speed replaced armor • She could therefore scout,
run down any raiding cruiser squadron, or any high speed armed merchant
ship, and keep the enemy's scouting cruisers away from the battle fleet*
There is little doubt that this concept was much more Fisher's favorite
than the DREADNOUGHT type battleship. His correspondence and papers
contain many references to its virtuoso Furthermore in 191^» he was
personally responsible for the action which resulted in REPLUSE, RENOWN,
FURIOUS, COURAGEOUS and HOOD. All of these ships, much altered in a
later life which extended to World War II, originally carried this concept
to an extreme degree. For example, FURIOUS as built, had light cruiser
protection and two 18" guns.
The contemporary arguments over the INVINCIBLE were much the same
as those over the DREADNOUGHT. As has been mentioned, they were tempered
by the fact that the DREADNOUGHT design was an accepted fact by the time
of INCINCIBLEf s completion. In addition, a far-sighted contemporary,
"i A.
still anonymous, wrote in Brassey's Naval Annual:
Vessels of this enormous size and cost are unsuitable for many of
the duties of cruisers; but an even stronger objection....is that
an Admiral having INVTNCXBLE& in his fleet will be certain to put
^Jane, Fighting Ships . 1919 edition; Parkes, British Battleships ,





them in the line of battle, where their comparatively light pro-
tection will be a disadvantage and their high speed of no value
,
In fact, World War I demonstrated the limitation of the concept
clearly o The ••cruiser-killing" function was effective only at the
17
Falkland and Helgoland actions, both in 1914. Jutland showed that
some features had been left out of consideration • First, low visi-
bility, very prevalent in the North Sea 9 would frequently result in
short range action or at least in unexpected encounter with heavy
ships within gun range o Second, the relatively long battle ranges
resulted in hits on deck by plunging shells, against which there was
very little pr©tecti©n<> Third, the natural aggressiveness of the
average Commanding Officer in battle, and the desire of any Admiral
to concentrate his whole force, resulted inevitably in these ships
coming into action with battleships, which was assuredly a role they
were not designed for
It seems fair to say that the battle-cruiser concept was an
error • Higher speed for battleships, the later British approach,
resulted in the QUEEN ELIZABETH class , which were used successfully
in World War II; heavier protection for battle cruisers, at some
sacrifice of speed and gun power, was the German approach. Either
step, the former particularly, produced much more effective fighting
ships e
17
H Ho Frost, The Battle of Jutland; Co Vo Usborne, Blast and
Counterblast ! Wo So Chalmers, David Beattyt Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet




The consensus of informed opinion on the loss at Jutland of three




ADMIRALTY ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
1
A Introduction^ The rest of the Admiralty structure under Fishery
administration presents a very large number of changes • These are briefly
discussed in this chaptero This cursory coverage is not because these
changes were unimportant; it is rather because they presented no drastic
overturning of the previous structure , are of a nature which any effective
administration might be expected to undertake, and are of nature readily
made clear in a few sentences because of their resemblance to problems
of our own service and tiraeo They should be mentioned to give a rounded
picture of the capacity of Fisher for executive delegation, combined
with enough detailed supervision to ensure control
o
Almost aH these activities were carried out in typical Fisher
style for matters of a relatively simple nature: a policy was set; an
individual or committee was appointed to take or recommend action; if
they failed to produce at once, they got the axe; if anyone got in their
way, he got the axe This sounds like Chapter I of a book on an old~
fashioned corporation president, and perhaps a sufficient portrait of
the 1904 Admiralty can be imagined to indicate the impact of this kind
of operation
o




B° GHSQfIX Th© standards of performance, frequency and methods
of practice were placed under the supervision of the Inspector of Target
Practice* To this post was appointed Rear Admiral Percy Scott, the
2
"father of modern gunnery<>" The idea for such a post stemmed from
the appointment of Wo So Siras
VJ
then a lieutenant commander, to a similar
post in the Uo S ^ V&th the assistance of Jellicoe, then Director of
Naval Ordnance, equipment was improved 9 competition between ships was
introduced and results promulgated through the fleet © The results were
spectacular; as Fisher was fond of quoting, the year before this step
was taken (1904), there were 2000 more misses than hitSo The yeas
after, 1906, with about the same number of rounds fired, the ratio was
reversed
•
Scott was every bit as difficult an individual as Fisher* He felt
he should have been a member of the Board • More important, he believed
that long range firing should not be introduced until effective fire
control methods, specifically Scott* s "director^Tiad been installedo
This did not coincide with Fisher's Idea, which was to extend ranges
rapidly in the interests of readiness to fight with what was available
.
This led to disagreement 9 but in the meantime, a great deal had been
accomplished both in actual results and in the attitude towards gunnery c
2
Co Vo Usbome, Blast and Counterblast o
3
Sir Percy Scott , Fifty. Years in The Roy^al Navy, (which is where
Scott quotes a description of himself as a "peculiar wild animal to let




-*The direct ancestor of all modern gun fire control systems*
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On board ship, the Captain* s future, as well as the Gunnery Officer* s,
now depended on gunnery This fact alone had a considerable effect*
C. Ship Maintenance u To make the reduced number of ships in
active commission fully effective^ stress was placed on repairs by the
ships force Teeth were given this stress by the rigid requirement
that only one battleship at a time from each fleet was to be in the
dockyards Ships requiring major repairs were decommissioned and re-
placed by reserve ships.
Do Submarines o Submarine development was pressed forward and
given considerable detailed personal supervision by Fisher* Forty-one
submarines were built during his six year period as First Sea Lord, as
contrasted with but 11 in the following 3 years before World War I began
E. Dockyards o These received a sweeping overhaul. A review of
the personnel requirements resulted in dismissal of 6,000 employees.
The internal organization of the Dockyards was changed so that the
Admiral Superintendent had effective coordination control of all the
departments—engineering , construction and ordnance—in the yard.
Duplication in facilities were reduced or eliminated • The heads of
the individual departments were "constituted as managers,*," A little
further research indicated that this meant these officers were given
relatively direct and complete authority and responsibility for the
"Bacon, Fisher . Vol 2o 9 p 9o
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work being done by their different departments, A Director of Dockyard
Work was appointed under the Controller of the Admiralty to complete
the chain of command with a central head. Production methods were
studied carefully in an effort to get all the Dockyards in a state
of efficiency similar to that which had enabled Portsmouth to build
DREADNOUGHT in a year,
Fo Supply o A committee renewed the entire supply system.
Inventory turnover was the first targeto e£ 2Q 9 G00,00C worth of stock
was held with big annual loss from deterioration • Open ended contracts
for commodity-type items (a modern tough) were adopted, among other
measures. Commercial items were substituted for "Admiralty Pattern"
where possibleo In many cases v the Admiralty was buying items long
since off the commercial marketc Stores issue was changed so as to
prevent scrapping and replacement of economically repairable items
•
Obsolete material was disposed of in quantity^ Duplicate supplies
amongst departments of the Admiralty were consolidatedo
All this sounds as if it could have been written yesterday, and
the achievements were substantial • There are many anecdotes of Fisher
in this area<> He evidently derived keen enjoyment from finding some
administrative or logistic absurdity and using it as a horrible ex-
ampleJ The eventual results were considerable a
'Obviously complete success *«ias impossible • The writers father
went to an Admiralty surplus auction when the Bewuda dockyard was
closed in 19^7° Some of the material had been there for many years.
One of the lots was: nPots 9 Chamber^ Fluted, Flag Officers, for the use
of - ** "
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The improvement of the living conditions of the "lower deck,"
discussed in Chapter VII , required a good deal of overhauling of the
supply branch operation 9 since "Purser9 s matters" included clothing,
messing and provisions
•
At this point it might be mentioned that many of the changes and
adjustments in the rating structures and pay are listed by Bacon as
"minor reforms," in the section from which much of this information is
drawno Since many of these proposals figured in "The Scheme," principally
as part of the detailed workings of the nucleus crew proposal, it does not
appear that Fisher thought them minor , an impression increased by his own
statements as quoted in Chapter VTI.
G» Budgetary and Fiseal u As part of the investigation of the
supply organization, the accounting methods throughout the Admiralty had
been brought up to date More important, however, were the budgetary
and fiscal reforms,, A committee was formed to review each proposed
"Vote," or appropriation in our parlance, which formed part of the
Navy Estimates (the Navy portion of the budget submitted to Parliament
by the Cabinet) » This committee, with Fisher himself as Chairman,
reviewed each vote with the Sea Lord responsible in great detail, seeking
possible reductions • It shortly became apparent that, as still happens
in the budgetary area, there were numerous cases in which he who was
responsible for the expenditure of the funds was not responsible for
preparing the budgetary estimateo Furthermore^ the requirements had in
many cases not been coordinated or viewed as an integral part of the
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whole until they reached a level at which it was impossible to assess
them in detail „ Estimates were padded so as to avoid all chance of
needing a supplementary vote
It is unnecessary to go into farther detail on this subject; the
resemblance to the budgetary problems and remedies of our own period
is most marked o Largely as a result of the work of this committee , the
Estimates decreased for 1905~6 9 despite the changes whioh had not fully
taken effect at that timeo They held steady in 1907-8, and began to
increase again in 1908-09 as a result of the increased building program.
This decrease in estimates furnished ammunition for those who argued
that the changes being made were solely for the sake of economy and
were detrimental to the security of the countryo
Chapter X completes the semi -chronological review of the actual
"Fisher reforms," and some of the specific controversies which resulted <>
Next, it seems appropriate to review two major generalized controversies
which arose during the period and which had important effects on the
service. Thereafter, some of the personal characteristics of Fisher





A<, Introductjono There were a number ©f generalized controversies
during Fisher 9 s period as First Sea Lord which are not readily assignable
to any one of the refomso They are 9 however , important to an tinder-
standing of the man and his methodSo This chapter deals with the two
most important examples • The first is his habitual method of ensuring
a loyal and efficient supporting staff , which gave rise to the expressive
term "Fishpond •" The second is the Fisher-Beresford controversy, a
violent public feud the full effects of which on the Royal Navy are
still the subject of disagreement
Be The "Fishpond u" There is no doubt that Fisher believed in early
identification of competent officers of brains and loyalty, and their
steady advancement by assignment to key billets • Marder quotes two
remarks drawn from some of the correspondence which sum up his views
well, "Favoritism is the secret of efficiency 9 n meaning the selective
assignment just mentionec § "If I haul a man up over the shoulders of his
seniors, that man is going to take care to show I haven 1 1 made a mi stake o w
Three examples of this policy are —the careers of JelHcoe, Madden, and
Bacon* Each of these officers was marked by Fisher as of high ability
as a junior Captain; the name of each is found in committees, and in key
Admiralty and Fleet appointments thereafter,, JelHcoe served successively
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as Director of Naval Ordnance, Second in Command of the Atl&ntic Fleet,
Third Sea Lord and Controller, Commander of the Second Division of the
Home Fleet, and Second Sea Lords There was no thought in anyone's mind
that these appointments were not merited* On the contrary, they were
approved* However, as one officer serving at the time wrote of 1914,
"Tears back, it had been common t8lk in the Admiralty that Admiral Jellico©
was being kept in cctton wool to command the Fleet in the Great War."2
The validity of the rumor is illustrated by many letters, including one
from Fisher to his son in 1912 <? Fisher continued to influence Churchill
in this regard until 1914o
While such action as this is justifiable, there is little doubt
that Fisher insisted upon completely loyal and wholehearted support frosa
his associates, that in many cases he took action to rid himself of those
who disagreed, and that he was capable of vindictive action against the
careers of those who actively opposed him u There were exceptions:
Sir Gerald Noel, who was Commander-in-Chief in China in 1905 » carried
his protests against the removal of his five battleships so far that
he was officially rebuked by the First Lord for his repeated communi-
cations direct to him instead of the Board, disregarding Fisher. Yet,
he held some further high appointments and became an Admiral of the
Fleet o The majority of the examples, however, show his normal practice
Jameson, The Fleet that Jack Built « pp 177-79
•
2
Usborne, Blast and Counterblast . p e 31
^Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought . Vol« 2 af p. 459.
harder, Road to War, p a &$
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to be the reverse of this episode ^ although some were doubtless pre-
judiced o His often repeated threat to make "the wives widows , their
children fatherless and their homes a dunghill" was well understood to
refer to the service careers of those who opposed him
Lady Wemyss 9 -* writes of an interview of her husband with Fisher*
He was offered the post of Naval Secretary (to the First Sea Lord),
an important position which he was naturally eager to take However,
he refused it indignantly when Fisher hinted that since Wemyss would be
advanced over many of his seniors , "absolute subserviency to his views"
would be demanded o Wemyss thereafter refused to speak to Fisher • While
Lady Wemyss was undoubtedly one of the society ladies who were part of
the pro»Beresford 9 anti-Fisher group, there is no reason to doubt her
veracity or that she accurately reflected the views of her husband , who
eventually became First Sea Lord in 1918o Wemyss had friends in positions
to protect him and never spoke out against Fisher
o
Keyes describes an episode in which he discovered in 190? that
he had incurred Fi sherds displeasure and was not to be appointed to a
command, essential to his futureo On being informed privately that he
was suspected of having helped with publicity for the Beresford side of
the controversy, he traced this rumor to its source and discovered that
the problem was one of circumstantial evidence and mistaken identity
o
Keyes later incurred Fisher* s disapproval because the latter believed
nLady Wemyss, The Life and Letters of Admiral of the Fleet, Lord
Westor Wemyss, p 99 ff <-
Lord Keyes e The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger
Keves, Volo 1, p 20 ffo
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Keyes responsible for the somewhat desultory progress made between 1910
and 191^ in s ibmarine readiness y an impression he was never able to get
Fisher t© leo go of Professor Marder quotes the ease of Lieutenant
Commander Domvilie 2 later an Admiral y from whom the story was obtained
in person© Domville wrote a prize essay in 1906 9 urging a stronger
secondary armament in Dreadnoughts ^ something which was anathema,
Domville outlines in detail efforts to shunt him into backwaters 9 and
to have him medically retired & before 1912/ Anyone Fisher considered
studpid got equally short shrift o Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee had in*
curred Fisher* s displeasure in earlier years© For this reason and
because he mentioned to Fisher in 191^ that he had suggested sending
battle cruisers to Cradock before Coronel y Fisher 9 s reaction was to
immediately inform Churchill that he would no longer tolerate "that
damn fool as Chief of Staff at the Admiraltyo"8
The consequence of episodes like these was a widespread impression
best described in the words of two of Fisher 9 s supporters, quoted by
Mardero Admiral Prince Louis of Battenbergs
He is a truly great man 8 and almost all his schemes have benefited
the Navy u But he has started this pernicious partisanship in the
Navy Q a ©Anyone who in any way opposed J0F0 went under Q9
7Marder , Road to War.c, p<> 860
o
Geoffrey Bennett , Colonel and the Falkland
S
o
°Battenberg» An Account,^ Admiral King^HaH.» l£p^o Quoted in Marder,





(Fisher) acted up to his ferocious declarationsoooto be a Fisherite
or, as the Navy put it v to be in the 8Fishpond® was, during his first
term of power , an indispensable prerequisite for prefermento^O
Naturally, it cannot be said that such a feeling is desirable in
any organization o Part C of this chapter contains a few comments on the
ultimate effects of the s Fishpond e problem and the Beresford feud which
follows •
C Fisher and J3gresford o
1° Beresford o First we should consider the opposing party
in this affairo Beresford was an officer of wealth and high social position,
who was a highly proficient seaman of the old schools He had not served
in steam ships , except briefly 9 for the first 14 years after he entered
the Navy in 1861 • He entered Parliament in 1874, as was then entirely
permissible for an active officer Thereafter, he several times contested
Admiralty policy in the House On at least one occasion, Admiralty ©Kc
jections to this conduct were overridden by the government of the day e
He had a highly successful naval career and came to public notice promi-
nently in the Egyptian campaign in the early 1380*
s
He was, as has been
mentioned earlier, important in the passage of the Naval Defense Act of
1889, after which he returned to sea v commanding a cruiser with substantial
success o Between 1891 and 1900 9 he was on half pay most of the time, re-
entering Parliament in I897 as member for Portsmouth North, where there
10Churchill 8 Great Contemporaries, p 299o Quoted in Marder, Road
to War a po 85o




were many Navy "lower deck" families . In 1900, it is fair to say that
he was the best known naval officer of his generation , extravagantly
popular with the public and with the fleet; his powers of leadership
were undoubtedly great o He was also very popular in society and had
been an honorary aide to the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VH)
since 1875° While his abilities as a seagoing naval officer were
considerable, it is also evident from his writing and speeches in
Parliament that his intellectual attainments were not great, and that
he was frequently most outspoken and even ill-considered in his public
statements • It is easy to see how the combination of Parliamentary
privilege and influence with success in the service could give almost
anyone the feeling of a unique position in the Navy, both as to knowledge
and influence, and also a feeling of vested right to head the service
Added to a strong will and an enormous popular following which, however,
was not quite as large as Beresford sometimes thought, the situation was
made to order for violent conflict
2 Fj^er_and_Beresford_^ First Stage Fisher and Beresford
seem to have worked fairly well together on the whole in the Mediterranean.
There was certainly friction, some of which has already been mentionedo
On the other hand, Fisher® s letters of the period^ both to Beresford
1? 1°'
and others, and Beresford e s ' comments in his memoirs, indicate a
Tlarder, Fear God and Dread Nought
V) Volo 1, Part H, Chap* I,
13
" Beresford , Memoirs of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford a
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degree of mutual respect and a willingness t© cooperate in reforms and
progress o Certainly Beresford continued a successful career as a Flag
Officer and by 1905 had become Commander-in-Chief , Mediterraneans
There are several ©pinions on the origins of the final dispute
o
ill u 15Chatfield 8 Bac©n 9 * Saith and others attributed it to the signalling
incident or some of the other episodes ©f Fisher* s Mediterranean Command-,
17
However, the writer agrees with Marder that Beresford was certain that
Fisher would retire in January 1906^ at the age limit and that Beresford
would succeed him When Fisher was appointed an additional Admiral of
the Fleet by Special Order in Council in 1905
s,
thereby gaining five more
years on the active listf Beresford 9 s h©pes were at an end That this
was the real cause of the final split is implied t© some extent by
Bacon
•
In any case 9 by the end of 1905$ Beresford was damning everything
the Admiralty did 8 publicly and privately , while Fisher could write
:
Thai blatant boastful ass Beresford has been writing the most
utter ^osh 1 jver read in ray life The outcome is that the Sea
Lords of the Admiralty are imbeciles and Beresford is the one and
only man who knows anything <>
Chatfield 9 The Navy_ and Defense , p Q kl
15
Bacon, PjLsher 9 Volo I 9 p e 138 ff
17
Marder 9 Rojad^ to War9 p 90 e
Fisher t© Balfour, September 1905 9 Marder9 Fear God and Dread
Nought, Vole HI, po 27o
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A few years earlier Fisher's letters had been excusing Beresford's
19indiscretions in supporting Fisher s ideas Beresford, as the most
senior and bj far the best known officer who was opposed to Fisher, as
well as an outspoken contr@versalist 9 was a natural center for the
opposition to Fisher o Fisher was t© speak frequently of the "conspiracy"
the members of which he referred to among other things as the "Adullandtes"
and the "syndicate of discontents" How much of a conspiracy there was
is not altogether .lear 9 although there is an amusing anecdote of a
scene in Beresford «s lining r©om A senior officer reporting to the
Board of Admiralty 9 who had served with Beresford, went round to call
on himo Being in unifom, he was shown in without inquiry to find
himself in the middle of a meeting of a ntaraber of very senior officers
who took great pains to drop papers under the table, or become others
wise employed, so that their identity would not become obvious to a sup-
20
posed Fisherite
3 e The Final Explpsion°°«190y^l9Q9 o In 1907, Beresford assumed
command of the Channel Fleet, which by then was the primary seagoing
force of the Navy Rear Admiral Reginald Custar.ee was his second in
commando He had collided with Fisher .a few years before while Director
of Naval Intelligence; was an ©ffieer of strong and dogmatic opinions,
and heartily dislike him Captain Doveton Sturdee 9 later the victor
19
Fisher to Lord Selbome, March 26, 1902, Marder, Fear God and Dread
Nought . Vol e I, p 9 23^-0




of the Falklands 9 was Chief of Staffo He also disliked Fisher, apparently
because Fisher had requested him tc write to him privately about Beresford 9
who was "inclined to be wild bout service matter?," Sturdeej, not un»
naturally , considered this unthinkably disloyal conduct and did not
21
comply o Bacon suggests that it was this combination of personalities
22
which caused Beresford to go as far as he dido
Whatever the proximate cause , Beresford immediately began a corre»
spondence with the Admiralty 9 the content ©f which spread through his
fleet and somewhat to the public , couched in remarkably tactless and
insubordinate terms . This correspondence dealt with all the reforms and
also the war plans . As mentioned earlier , he referred to the new Home
Fleet as "a fraud upon the public and a danger to the empire " The
Admiralty and Fisher were impelled to reply,, pointing out that his
language was not conducive to good relations , At that time General War
Orders were issued by the Admiralty Plans were prepared by the Fleet
Commanders , based on these orders , for approval An acrimonious c©rg>e~
spondence on the subject developed which ended in an interview between
Beresford , Fisher and Lord Tweedmouthj, then the First Lordo The trans»
script of this meeting exist
s
It supports the contention of many
writers that Beresford 9 s intellectual attainments and judgment were
by no means the equal of his other personal qualitieso It also il=
lustrates the insubordination of Beresford 9 although he denied any such
21Comment by Sturdee Quoted in Bennett , Corpnel and Falkland
s
t
p e 118 o The specific source is not given* although Admiral Sturdee»s
unpublished recollections are listed in the bibliography c





intention or action • ' Fisher* s correspondence is colorful in this
period , and indicates he made some efforts to get along with Beresford*,
24
In January 9 he wrote?
I had three hours with Beresford yesterday , and all is settledooo
but I had as a preliminary to agree to three things*, I Lord Co
Beresford is a greater man than Nelson II « No one knows anything
about the art of naval war except Lord Co Beresford • III. The
Admiralty hasn*t done a single d—<—d thing right©
The controversy languished slightly between July and late 190? , but
there were a series of episodes of various sorts thereaftero In one
instance 8 he stated officially that the Admiralty was taking action which
"had the appearance of a wish to handicap and hamperooo" and was pre-
judicing the careers of officers associated with him. In another instance,,
he endeavored to have Percy Scott
e
by now in command of the 1st Cruiser
Squadron, relieved in a dispute about an ill-judged exchange of signals.
The Admiralty declined to do so
By 1908 9 the controversy had become service-wide knowledge and was
receiving publicity more and more frequently • Fisher and Beresford were
publicly not on speaking terms The Beresford element had consolidated
all of the various charges against the Fisher administration and was
demanding an ©pen inquiry into Admiralty policy o Such a situation could
not be tolerated • After considerable pressure on the part of Fisher , the
application of which did little to change his opinion of politicians,
and with the backing of Reginald MeKennaj, now the First Lord, the de-
cision was made to terminate Beresford »s command when the consolidation
^Marder, Road to War, pp 9?~5<>
2TLetter of January 21, 190? 9 Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought
,
Volo 2, p 115e
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between Channel and Home Fleets took place in March 1909*, The agitation
and public interest were greatly increased by the Naval Scare of l?08<=09o
This scare involved considerable public alarm over German shipbuilding
programs , and criticism of the Admiralty for an inadequate program* It
had been building up over the same period as the controversy, 1907->09»
The Admiralty became convinced ©f the situation sufficiently to insist,
under the leadership of MeKenna and Fisher 9 on eight battleships instead
of four in the 1909 program. The situation became an acute Cabinet crisis %
the Sea Lords and McKenna were ready to resign on the one hand and some
of the radical Cabinet members were ready to do the same on the other
o
Spuiruti on by party polities , the public uproar became acuteo The
Admiralty was accused of having placed the nation in a position in which
Germany would overtake them in capital ships in the next few years, and
also of having been blind to long continued German preparations. In the
end, the rumors of German achievements turned out to be exaggerated, but
at this moment 8 the Admiralty was being severely criticized for being
"caught napping o"
With this uproar as well as a fine public reception on giving up
his command behind him, Beresford conferred with Balfour , then a leading
Opposition member 9 and then went to Asquith 8 the Prime Minister, with a
demand for a public investigation by the Cabinet, threatening to go to
the public with the issue if the inquiry were not granted o Asquith
finally agreed to private investigation by a subcommittee of the Committee
of Imperial Defense, composed of Cabinet mambers Beresford made a number
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of charges y quit© general in nature^ in writingo These are discussed
in the following section
o
The fact that an inquiry was granted at the instance of an officer
serving in a subordinate position was a blow which staggered Fishers
He considered the Cabinet was literally condoning mutiny and wished to
resigno He was dissuaded from this aet 9 which of course would have given
credibility to the charges
•
Imagine what a state of affairs when a meeting of naval officers
on the active list in a room in Grosvenor Street is able to coerce
the Cabinetuoo ^
The committees deliberation was lengthy At one pointy it came to
light that two officers in the Naval Intelligence Department had been
supplying Beresford with confidential information to support his case
This revelatioi did little to help Beresford® s allegations of underhanded
tactics against him 9 and enraged Asquitho
In the end 9 the committee finding indicated that the Admiralty had
not endangered the country e and that Beresdord had failed to carry out
their instructions and recognize their authority They watered this down
by saying that the Board should have taken Lord Charles more into their
confidence Fisher characterized the finding as **a most cowardly pro-
26ductiono" It contained one recommendations the establishment of a
Naval War Staff There was no suggestion that Beresford had made a
"frivolous eomplainte" in the sense of the naval regulations against
25
Letter of April 13, 190% quoted in Bacon , Volo 2, p 50 <
26
Bacon^ Fishera Volo 2 9 p 56"
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such conduct , although this was the ©pinion of many of the Cabinet memberso
Although privately supported by King Edward , who remained as staunch
a supporter1 as he had been for many years , and by many members of the
Cabinetj, the controversy was becoming too great Fisher still had a
year before retiring age c However, his only logical successor was
Admiral of the Fleet Sir A c Ko Wilson,, who would assure continuity of
policy but was only two years youngero Fisher therefore resigned effective
January 25» 1910o He became a Peer* as Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, on
November 9» 1909
De Summery of ii<Soiurces_oT_Conflict in the Fisher Administration 6 It
is convenient here to mention the main charges levelled at Fisher, both
formally in the Beresford committee inquiry, and informally within and
without the service
Beresford *s main charge was that the organization of the Admiralty
for war was defective, specifically in that he had not been given proper
means to carry out his mission G This charge was disposed of by the
conanittee; it amounted to a question ©f judgment as to proper measures
However, he also charged that the alleged deficiencies in war plans were
due to the lack of a Naval War Staff • There was in fact no operational
staff at the Admiralty in Fisher9 s time* and he was adamantly opposed
to such an organization He was a firm believer in ©ne«man control,
more especially in war, and he felt strongly that war plans should be a
matter of the utmost secrecy and known to as few as possible* This
attitude, however, did not indicate a disinterest in strategy because
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of a total preoccupation with material The lectures to the Mediterranean
Fleet officers and the establishment of the Naval War College at Portsmouth
in 1906 $ as well as much of his correspondence , confirm his ense ©f the
importance of such matters
o
The question of a Naval War Staff is related to a charge that Fisher
substituted ©ne»man control for the traditional Board operation. This is
correct , as nearly as we can distinguisho There were few Board meetings
while he was First Sea Lord| he preferred to deal with each member indi»
vidually and he and the First Lord would then proceed to a decisiono As
will be mentioned in a later chapter, Fisher took care that he always
had the First Lord*s backing , whether by overawing him or by convincing
him of the merits of his plans • No one in the government was really
under the impression anyone else was running the Admiralty; he was even
consulted in the later appointments of First Lords© On one occasion, in
27
1905, his letters record that he rejected Balfour* s nominee • Fisher s
backers felt that this was the only way the changes could have been ac-
complished o Certainly it was the only way Fisher was willing to worko
Marder points out that the First Lord and First Sea Lord were under no
28
legal obligation to consult the Board as a whole or as individuals
The other Board members retained the legal duty of refusal to concur
with a decision , but their powers of influence were negative only, as
implied by the discussion in Chapter IHo Under the form of the British
2?Letter of March 3, 1905* Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought a Vol.
3» p- 24o
28
Road to Wy? 9 p 79o
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Constitution 8 a change in procedure can easily give rise to argument
about constitutional!ty There is also testimony that prior t* aking
a decision he was ©pen to argument and discussion to a substantial degree
«
Bacon and Jellieoe-^ both leave words to this effect
o
Another charge was that of "espionage" in the Fleet « Fisher was
in the habit of calling on relatively junior officers for opinions , and
this led him to requests for correspondence which were resented when
discoveredo A major explosion took place in 1908 9 when some letters
which Bacon had written him while in the Mediterranean in 1905 under Lord
Charles Beresford were revealed These contained nothing in the way of
comments on Beresford , but they did relate to policy and political compli-
cations o The fact that such correspondence took place was shocking to
manyo "Espionage" is an excessively strong term; however 9 this was at
least an ususual method of obtaining information
o
Charges of favoritism and vindictiveness have been discussed earlier
in this chapter in the "Fishpond" section
o
Another charge arose from the use made of the press • This was
anathema to most of the Royal Navy in that day The interest of the
press in the Navy has been discussedo Making use of this 9 Fisher took
care that he had the backing of the press and that they were given
proper communication This resulted in at least an even division of
press support in the controversy o Spender y Stead and Arnold White were
^Bacon 9 Fisher 9 Volo l f Chap IX; also a quote in Marder, Roa^
to War 9 po 8O0
30
" Quoted in Marder 8 Road to War 9 p 80
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three journalists who were among his close associates In his corner
during his time as First Sea Lord were most of the Liberal press and
some of the Conservatives, most importantly » "The Times o" While far
from the norm of Navy policy in the period, it may be considered in-
evitable in the circumstance that the press was used to stave off
attack
o
A final charge was the haste employed and the unnecessary antagonisms
generated in making the reforms That the refoms had been thoroughly
worked out, both in earlier years and in current detailed planning, is
clear from the discussion of the individual reforms earlier in this
paper*. Rapid execution was a basic Fisher technique for ensuring com-
pletion, and therefore reasonable evaluation not based on theory but en
a tested concepto In some cases, such as the DREADNOUGHT , haste was
essentialo The antagonism was an unfortunate personal Fisher character^
istic which is discussed in Chapter XHo
This completes the summary of the basis for most of the controversies
<
It is worthwhile considering here the long range effects of these con-
troversies, which have been debated over many years. The writer has
encountered all sorts of comments, some acrimonious in the literature*
It appears that as far as his opponents are concerned, the older and
more bitter were gone by 1914 o There were still some who disliked him
and tended to lay all deficiencies at his door; Wemyss is one„ But al=
most all seem to have acquired a more objective attitude, recognizing
the benefits for what they were It is most notceable that no one,
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except in the extreme heat of anger in 1909 » ever questioned his motives
in acting as he did—his devotion t© the good of the service was too
obvious and well known
Beatty 9 s-^ attitude seems to the writer to express the feelings of
many who were never on the policy level during Fisher* s tour as First
Sea Lord and never had a serious encounter with him This was an attitude
of mild distaste for a personality and method that were highly anomalous
in the service of the time 9 and an objective attitude towards the positive
achievements of Fisher and those he trained Much of the World War I
period material reflects this; it appears to the writer to indicate that
the "dissension" did not last long enough or extend far enough down the
fleet, to have any serious effect after war broke outs Fisher* s return,




case of those of whom he diapproved, eogoy Keyet>| and certainly there
was private dismay in some quarters o^3 However, the effectiveness of
his energetic action in getting things moving seem to have carried the
confidence of most of the fleet, as indicated by the letters on his
34
resignation in 1915 • On the whole, it seems justifiable to conclude
that, except for those who may have lacked confidence in his leadership
in 1914-15? the effects of the dissensions a few years earlier are not
31
Chalmers^ X^fe and Letters of David Beattv. p 85 et seq
32
Keyes, Navajo Memoirs,, Vol 6 1, p 129*
-^cf» Wemyss, p G I860
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discernible in the performance ©f the Royal Navy in World War I«
This does not necessarily apply to other aspects of the Fisher






WHAT MANNER OF MAN IS THIS?1
A, Iptroductiorio Before going on to glance at 'World War I, and some
speculations on lessons for our own tirae 9 let us consider some of the
personal characteristics of the individual -whose accompli shments and
difficulties we have been reviewing* Presumably the fact that Fisher*
s
personality, characteristics and methods were sources of difficulty
has been made clear© As Professor Harder says:^
Fisher inevitably made enemies—he made them right and left, ( Ke
took them all on and there was something about him which goaded
enmity to dementia*^
For the purpose of this paper, which is to produce a sketch of the
Fisher era as an example of the management of a Navy, it is desirable to
consider some apparent contradictions in a little detail: while the
achievements of the era are undoubted, it was for a long time difficult
for the writer, as a naval officer, to understand how such a man could
have led a service, especially a service such as the Royal Navy of 1890=
1910, to these achievements*
Recently the writer made a study of Fisher as revealed in the liter-
ature against one of the better known sets of leadership criteria The
illustrative material has been largely included in the earlier portions
of this paper. The evaluation is summarized briefly in this chapter, A
rlark XV; 14, "What manner of man is that that even the wind and
sea obey him?**
carder, Road to War, p e 81 The internal quote I assume to be frost?
the Journals and Letters of Lord Esher.
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illustrative incidents which are particularly appropriate are also in-
cluded o
Be grjjterjao The object of this portion is not to evaluate "quality"
of leadership, but to relate Fisher 1 s behavior to modern scales designed
to measure what leaders do in attaining group goals • The criteria used
are drawn from a series of Ohio State University Leadership studies,
3
and are the following:
a 9 Communications; measured by the degree to which the leader
communicates with subordinates
•
b. Organization; measured by the degree to which the leader
structures the group which he supervises,
c. Integration; measured by the degree to which he irtagrates
his unit into a closely built working team*
d. Representation; measured by the degree to which he speaks or
acts as representative of the group
•
e. Relations with subordinates; measured by the degree to which
he maintains cordial working relations with juniors,
fo Relations with superiors; measured by the degree to which he
maintains cordial working relations with superiors
An important general point in considering Fisher's leadership is
his identification with the main goal of the Royal Navy, considered as
a group. Few of his opponents ever questioned his motives—his patriotism
and loyalty to the Navy* When they did so, as in the case of Beresford
in the last stages of the controversy, they were hardly taken seriously
Leadership
3StogdiH and Shartle, Methods in the Studjr of Admini strative
%f . Beresford, The Betrayal
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C* Communlcations * The evidence on this dimension is conflicting
•
On the one hand, we have often-used phrases from his pen, "Never explain,"
and "It is only damn fools who argue n On the other hand, we have the
fact that he went so far in his efforts to receive accurate information
on conditions and opinions as to encourage, and even require, corre-
spondence from Captains in some of the key positions in the various
fleets e While effective^ this sort of correspondence led to the charges
of espionage discussed in Chapter XI , Section Co
On balance, it appears that he took many positive steps to ensure
adequate communication when he felt it required e His lectures to the
officers of the Mediterranean Fleet and views on reducing internal
Navy official secrecy are clearly recorded <• His voluminous corre-
spondence indicates he took pains to make himself understood, except
by those whom he believed to be permanently opposed to what he contemplated,
D. Representation » This stands out as an area in which Fisher
was strong o Marder states:
When he became First Sea Lord, the heads of big shipbuilding,
engineering, and ordnance firms, professors and many other great
and oi<*ver men always seemed anxious, ready, and willing to carry
out his views • No person in his day could get big things done
quicker than Lord Fisher.7
His relations with the public and press redounded very much to the
advantage of the Navy© He was most successful in using the press and
-*Fear God and Dread Nought, Volo 2
cacon, Fisher, Volo 1, p 175^
Fear God and Dread Nought . Volo 2, p« l? c
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maintaining good relations -with them, as mentioned in Chapter XI.
Fisher was somewhat less successful in dealing with parliamentary-
poll ticians s The main difficulty was a strong contempt for politicians—
o
"less for their want of brains then for their lack of character^.," as
illustrated earHero
E* Organization o A discussion of Lord Fisher's activities which
tended "to prescribe ways of doing things" is unnecessary in view of
the extensive discussion of him as a one»man Admiralty© However, some
amplification as to his working methods is appropriate.
His actual working habits are good evidence of the amount of de-
tailed management he did while at the Admiralty • He was always ready
for work by 5 or 5s 30 AM, sometimes as early as 4. He dealt with papers
which required consideration in detail or thought during these early
morning hours, and on Sundays. He retired invariably by 9 J 30 PM when
working o As a sidelight, this caused a considerable problem when he was
associated with Winston Churchill in 191^-15 1 since for all practical
purposes the two had few common working hours • There are frequent
accounts by those associated with him of his very rapid grasp of the
content of a paper, and quick decisions o We have seen examples of his
reactions to opposition; however, before a decision was taken and if
he trusted the speaker 9 Bacon testifies that?
No man of strong views was ever so open to argument as Lord Fisher*
Open to be convinced on any matter of which he had not himself
accurate and technical knowledge, but adamant where prevision
Road to War, p e 17 e
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led him to form his own conclusions o
After a recital of some details , Bacon continues?
It is details such as these that 9 for those -who knew him, dispelled
the idea that he was a hasty, self-willed autocrat in all matters
affecting his opinions 00 o9
In short, not surpsisingly , in method of operation Fisher fits the
description of a number of conspiciously successful business executives
of the period between his own and ©urso
Fe Integration o There is no difficulty in resolving this area.
Information in relation to "behavior which tends to hold the group
together" is almost entirely negative • To understand why this might
be so, it is only necessary to consider the examples so far cited of
his contempt for tradition and disregard of human values in dealing with
others in the service Q "Do right and damn the odds" was a phrase he was
found of, and seems an accurate description of his views on anyone who
seemed obstructive* His comments on members of the service reflected
in the correspondence are violent to a degrees The "blatant boastful
ass" applied to Beresford is relatively milde
His motive in his personnel methods is not open to question. However,
the effects at the time were not good for morale • "Fear of reprisal
haunted those not in the Fishpond o"-^
"obituary Notice^ 1920, quoted in Marder, Road to War, p<> 81<
10Marder, Road to War 9 p 87
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G. Relations -with Subordinates . His great personal charm and the
driving force of his personality are well attested to, and the effect
on his more junior subordinates, the public, and those outside the
11
Navy is clear o There are a number of accounts of considerate treatment
accorded junior officers Fisher felt deserving and in need of assistance,
the cheerfulness of his behavior, and his unassuming manner when in
12
their company • However, the manner in which he often treated his more
senior subordinates had the effect , in many cases, of earning him their
permanent enmity and doing considerable damage « One brief illustration
not yet mentioned is quite helpful «, It is drawn from the experience
of Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, the Submarine Force Commander in 1914 , "Why
1?
can»t that fellow Keyes go to sea and fight like Trywhitt 1 ,, was Fisher* s
comment to a group of officers in the Admiralty. When this reached Keyes,
who was known as one of the most dashing officers in the Navy, and had
been ordered to remain ashore so that he could effectively control his
submarines, it helped to confirm him in his impression that he could not
possibly continue in charge of the submarine force. His departure soon
afterwards appears to have been detrimental to the submarine effort to
a considerable degree
•
He Relations with Superiors . A view of Fisher^s relations with
superiors indicates that he must be considered highly effective in this
"harder, Road to War Q po l4o
12
Ho H. Smith gives a number of examples,
^Keyes, Naval Memoirs tt Volo 1 9 p^ 13.
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area. He worked in relative harmony with a variety of personalities as
First Lord; King Edward >II was a close friend and loyal supporter . The
position of the civilian First Lord has been discussed earlier (Chapter III)
Thus, there is no doubt that Fisher was the direct subordinate of the First
Lord during this period, a fact which is sometimes slurred over. The
position of the King is also of importance • Constitutionally, his power
is essentially nil e Practically, his influence can be immense, since he
is the titular head of the service and the grantor of each officer 1 s
comndssiono There are many anecdotes of the effect of Fisher's volatile
and energetic temperament in the somewhat stuffy court circles, and of
the high regard Edward VH had for him© Fishers reaction on his death
14
was, "I've lost the greatest friend I ever hadooo" One of the
anecdotes is quoted in full*, It illustrates well Fisher's regard for
the King's opinion, although action did not follow, and one of the more
unfortunate aspects of Fisher's personality. Fisher writes j*5
Just then a certain Admiral approached—perhaps the biggest ass I
ever met. The King shook hands with him and said something I thought
quite unnecessarily loving to him; when he had gone he turned on me
like a tiger and said, "You ought to be ashamed of yourself !" I
humbly said, "What for?" "Why!" he replied, "when that man came up
to me your face was perfectly demoniacal! Everyone saw it and the
poor fellow couldn't kick you back! You're First Sea Lord and he's
a ruined man! You've no business to show your hate!". ••then a man
came up I knew the King did perfectly hateoooHe greeted him as if he
was his long lost brother, and then he turned to me afterwards and
said with joyful revenge, "Well! Did you see that." oe .no wonder
he was so popular
«
^Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought . Volo 2, p. 326«
•"Memories and Records, Volo 1, p 23c
123

1° Some Additional_Notes on JJ^h^ts_J^er^onalityo One aspect of
Fisher's personality is not brought out in the earlier discussion.. Much
of the material in the literature creates an impression of a paranoid
tendencyo
First g he was markedly suspicious of others, both as to their motives
and their actions toward him e He often said and wrote:
I entered the Navy penniless 8 friendless and forlorn* I had had to
fight like hell, and fighting like hell has made me what I am e l°
His correspondence abounds in such phrases as: "Lord Everly behaved most
disgracefully toward me 00 oI , ra damned if he didn't quote my private con-
versation • ••"*' and "There is also t© be a personal attack, by Lord
18
Glasgow, I bslieveoooon your humble servant© o© M His suspicions of
Germany, of course well founded, and of other foreign nations, find
equally frequent expression* A more complex and elaborate illustration
19
of his suspicion is in the incident related by Keyes,
Second, he thought, and wrote, and often acted, in a highly aggressive
imagery and vindictive manner, as illustrated earlier** His habitual
violence of speech was well shown by his speeches at the Hague Peace
Conference of 1899 • Very few Flag Officers in history would have suggested
boiling prisoners in oil to such a gathering
o
16
Marder 9 Road to War 8 p 15©
17
Marder, Fear God and J)read Noughts, Volo 2, p, 199,
-1 o
Marder 9 Fear God, and Dread Njsujht 8 p^ 69©
19
Keyes, The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet S^r Roger Keyes
»
pp e 20 ffo, referred to in Chapter XI , Section Ao
herder, Road to War, p 86

«J® Conclusion » The personality of Fisher presents many contradictions
for one in his position and of his accompli shementso There is n© question
but that his greatest strength, in terms of the leader behavior descritions
used, was in the areas of organization, representation, and relations with
superiors o He was less strong in communications, and very weak in the
areas of integration and relations with subordinates.
It would appear that the successful leadership achieved is not
difficult to account for e Fisher f s complete dedication to the readiness
of the Navy and his country were obvious . His ability to organize movement
toward this goal and to carry the rest of the Admiralty and the government
of the day along with him was sufficient to gain him the respect and
loyalty of a large majority of the service, particularly the younger element
below flag rank, and to overcome the difficulties he created in the other
areas. Coir own more recent experience tells us that what seems like
disastrous dissension, when viewed at the seat of the government, may seen
only minor disagreement when viewed from the fleet.
Fisher was clearly of great mental capacity, imagination, breadth of
mind and drive; in short an executive of extraordinary talent • It is
perhaps open to question how far his creative ability extended, or how
deep his insight was It seems to the writer that his capacity for pro*
found analysis may not have as great as his other abilities.
Ko Having taken a brief overview of the accomplishments, and the
problems of the Fisher regime, and a look at the characteristics of the
creator of both, it remains to draw some conclusions both general and
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specific o Before doing so, however 9 it is necessary to remember that
there is one ultimate test of Sea Power,, and that is war© Therefore, it
seems appropriate to open Part III with a brief treatment of those aspects
of World War I which seem to most directly reflect the Fisher decisions
and influence within the period of this study
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PART III - RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER XIII
WORLD WAR I - SOME PARTICULAR ASPECTS
A, Introduction s This discussion of World War I is of a very strictly
confined nature c As mentioned earlier* the subject is huge: there are
entire libraries on it; the writer is not qualified by any means to
attempt such a work, and finally , the events and evaluations are familiar
and well documented history*
It is a generally acknowledged fact that the Fleet which fought the
war and held the North Sea to finally starve out the Germans, in both
men and ships, was the creation of Fisher 8 A flag officer who was never
an admirer stated the situation quite simply in July 191*S looking at
the assembled fleet, "All that is best and most modern here is the
creation of Lord Fisher*" For this reason* the positive aspects of the
accomplishment can be left to the judgment of history. There are certain
negative aspects of material and leadership which have been much debated
and are directly traceable to decisions and actions of the Fisher era.
These logically form a part of this study « Fishers performance himself,
from November 1915 to May 1915* during his brief return as First Sea Lord,
falls outside the limits set for the study and would add little to other
examples of management already set outo The methods were the same; at




quoted in Jameson, The Fleet, that Jack Built,
p. 167. 1?7

Therefore , only a few specific points are discussed: the training,
to indicate how closely the 191^ Royal Navy was still Fishers; the ships;




1911»1933 . 2 Sir Ae Ko Wilson, "Old 'Art" to
the lower deck, was an officer of great integrity and considerable personal
administrative ability, but inarticulate to t degree and highly secretive
He also was much opposed to a Naval Staff o However, a change of govern-
ment b "•ought Winston Churchill as First Lord in 1911 • Supported by
Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg as Second Sea Lord, with Beatty as
Naval Secretary, and in any case an admirer of Fisher 1 s accomplishments,
Churchill pursued, with more diplomacy, the path of reform.
A War Staff was organized, with planning responsibility for the
operational side of war as an integrated whole This was a unique
organization in the history of the Admiralty, and the problem of training
officers in staff work was not one which could be dealt with in two years*
Churchill consulted Fisher freely o The latter was living abroad,
until add- -912, and the extent of their collaboration was not widely
known. Churchill kept it as quiet as possible, although some public notice
was taken when Fisher was appointed to the Oil Fuel Commission in 1912°
The major accomplishments of the Churchill period, aside from the
War Staff, were: the introduction of oil fuel for heavy ships; the
QUEEN ELIZABETH class of battleships with 15" guns, heavy protection and
Tlain sources: Road to War, The Fleet that Jack Built
,
Fear God and




25 knots speed; further important revisions of the Naval Discipline Act,
pay and promotion for the "lower deck" in 1919 . The Fisher influence
is clear from his letters on all of those steps. Development and building
of battleships continued at a rapid pace
Co The Ships - 19l4
1° CrtLl sers Q In 1914, the early operations of the war revealed
one major deficiency in the shipbuilding programs between 1905 and 1911*
It will be recalled that Fisher* s 1904 scheme proposed nothing but armored,
that is, battle cruisers and heavy destroyers The battle cruisers had,
as the Germans built equivalent ships, tended to concentrate in the
North Sea. The advent of the submarine made the use of a battle cruiser
for blockade duties, which involved stopping to examine merchantmen, a
ridiculous risko The high cost of battle cruisers had limited their
numbers severely so that the detachment of INVINCIBLE and INFLEXIBLE to
carry out a mission of the sort they were built for, the Falkland s cam-
paign of late 1914, was only reluctantly accepted by Jellicoe, in command
of the Grand Fleet <? The protection of trade turned out to have been
adequately provided for until the advent of the submarine as a commerce
destroyer, foreseen only in 1913 by Fisher and few others The losses
in foreign waters were not important o However 9 ships for the blockade
of Germany were not available The large destroyers of the Fisher era,
and a few "scouts" slightly large and slower
s had not the sea-keeping
qualities nor the range for the purpose o The armed passenger liners
3




and old cruisers used proved highly vulnerable to surface and submarine
attacko The Grand Fleet and its supplementary forces suffered also from
a lack of ships with the necessary range and sea-keeping ability for
scouting . The last armored cruisers of moderate dimensions were completed
in 1908; no cruisers except the scouts were completed between 1905 and
1911 f when the first of the "Town" class came into service. Only 1?
of this type had been completed by the outbreak of war e The situation
was recognized by Fisher 1 s successors but the building program to remedy
the situation had just begun at the outbreak of war
This cruiser shortage must be considered an error in judgment by
Fisher; the writer does not agree that it was as important as is implied
5by Mr Q Young's statement cited earlier • This statement may be an echo
of some of the judgments of Lloyd George on the war, many of which have
not withstood the test of time*
2 Battle Cruisers ,, The problems of these ships have been
mentioned in the discussions of their design They are often spoken of
as a type which was poorly designed • This point of view is to the writer
superficial; rather, the missions and circumstances of operations for
which the ships were designed were too specialized and not sufficiently
analyzed The writer in "Brassey" in 1908, already mentioned, reflects
a doubt which must surely have been fairly widespread at the time, and
^i , M. LeFleming, Warships of World War lo
^Chapter III, p 15
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seems to have been well founded
3° Submarines.* Despite Fisher's interest in submarines, Keyes
blamed the lack of ocean-going types in 191^ on him 9 since he had been
primarily interested in them as a coast defense weapon It is also true
that A® K Wilson, in 1902 9 considered them a*, inferior and un-Ehglish
weapon, an opinion shared by manyo However, Churchill pressed the
development of submarines, which proceeded with a clear goalo "While
Keyes is perhaps a little unfair, therefore^ it does seem that if a policy
of developing the submarine as a sea-going weapon had been originated
under Fisher, the state of affairs would have been different in 191^.
It is also clear that Fisher himself did not appreciate the potentialities
of the submarine as a weapon until 1913 or thereabouts,/ This failure
if it was one, was of omission—a non-application of judgment, rather
than a mi s-applications A correct appraisal of the case by Fisher in
1913 would have put him well in advance of contemporary thought.
Do Operational Performance .
1. Perhaps the most important question of the influence of the
Fisher era in World War I is raised by the performance of the operational
leadership* This also is a question with which the available literature
up to now does not deal with objectively or in details, Professor Marder
states" that it is the focus of his work at the present time; succeeding
^eyes, Naval Memoirs. Vol© 1, pp 101-2,
7
'Marderj, Road to War, p 333<>
c
Letter U the writer, September 1963 c
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volumes of From The Dreadnought to Seapa Flow will undoubtedly fill this
gap. However, some evaluation of this performance is essential, since
there is little doubt that the leaders, as well as the ships, of 191^
were products of the Fisher era c The officers up to the rank of Captain
had gained all their most significant training and experience since 1905*
under the increased pace and constant introduction of new ships and
material o The more senior officers had been selected (by the duties they
were assigned) for their higher rank during the Fisher period • Not all
were products of the "Fishpond," but not many had been numbered among
Fisher's active opponents
The topic divides conveniently into areas: the personnel of the
ships; the Admiralty; and the Fleet commanders,
2 8 Ships Personnel c This is the most favorable as well as the
simplest area The ships officers of the period were highly motivated,
— had the utmost confidence in their ships and equipment' and were
backed by enlisted personnel of ability and loyalty* Their training
had been intensive and realistic*. Cunningham, Ho H. Smith, Dreyer,
Wemyss, Chatfield and many others have left vivid word pictures of
the vigor and realism with which training of all sorts was carried out
in the years preceding the war Gunnery was of a high standard, as
o





far as the coctrine of the day had carried it* However, long range high
11
speed firings had only been introduced in 1913 under Beatty. It seems
reasonable to say that as far as the officers and men of the ships are
concerned, the Royal Navy entered World War I in as high a state of
readiness as has ever been achieved at such a time.
3° The Admiralty as sn Operational Headquarters. When war broke
out, the Admiralty in Whitehall found that they were in fact an operation?!
headquarters to a degree which they had not suspected before the war.
The Fleet Commander, specifically the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand
Fleet had neither the time, staff, information nor responsibility to
control the multitude of subsidary tasks such as blockade, minesweeping
and patrolling which speedily became necessary • Furthermore, it soon
became apparent from some 191^- operations that the North Sea was a con-
fined body of water and required the attention of an area commander for
proper employment of forces, as well as, or instead of, a Fleet Commander-
in-Chief. These duties devolved upon the Admiralty as the only existing
common authority. Additionally, the world-wide nature of the conflict
soon became apparent; the coordination problems were only equalled by
those of World War II. A final complication was the emergence cf
Churchill »s liking for strategy and tactics, whid led more immediately
and positively than might otherwise have been the case to centralized
operational control by the Admiralty
-'-'Harder, Portrait of an Admiral » Interestingly enough they indicate
strongly that Fisher may have been right about Sturdee»s limited abilities t
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This study does not have a place for extensive examples of the
problems which arose • It is certain that the Admiralty* s performance
of this function was less than optimums Those who served there in
191^1918 and left records, among them Richmond, Weymss, Jellicoe end
Keyes, are in agreement that the difficulties and failures of coordination
and strategic planning were numerous, and continued to be so throughout
the war* The staff organization was not set up for the handling of routine
operational decision and proper staff work on major decisions. Their
position was primarily advisory* Richmond^ diaries are scathing in
the early part of the war, and critical throughout <, Captain Roskill's
analysis, drawing somewhat on Richmond's, e@n@ludes that as 8 whole
the performance of British sea power was disappointing. This the writer
cannot fully agree with. After all is said and done, if the High Seas
Fleet had gained control of the North Sea, or if the Royal Navy with the
U. S. had not beaten the submarine in 1917-18, the results of the war
would surely have been quite different. Both Richmond and Roskill
attribute the poor performance of the Admiralty to the lack of organized
and trained naval staff, and to a lack of appreciation of the need for
an intellectual or analytical approach to strategy. This analysis seems
quite accurate*. There seems to be little doubt that if Fisher had seen
a need and organized a Naval Staff in 1905$ the situation would have
been vastly different. The basic difficulty in 191^-18 in the Admiralty
would appear to have been an inability to get the operational matters
12S. Wo Roskill, The Strategy of Sea Power, pp. 101-42, especially
p. 139« A 1962 booko
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out of the traditional channels of the Sea Lords, which were primarily
administrative in intent • This was plainly the result of neither staff
nor Sea Lords having a knowledge of operational staff methods. Captain
Roskill attributes this to the influx of technical matters early in the
20th century which took over naval education and training. The writer
does not agree that this is necessarily cause and effect. Fisher
evidently did not see the necessity for staffs despite the available
example of the German General Staff, which was already famous as a land
organization^. Churchill did, but none of Fl sherds successors possessed
the inclination or drive needed to make a naval staff a going concern
inside four years.
It must be said that in this particular, Beresford was right. However,
Beresford f s writing does not create the impression of a man likely to
develop such a suggestion. An interesting study might be tracking down
the true originator A nodding acquaintance with the candidates suggests
Custance.
4. Fleet Leadership . As before, this paper does not have a
place for an extensive discussion of this extensively debated subject.
A few general points are drawn which can be considered products of the
Fisher era.
Opinions have varied in the J a ;t forty years as to whether Beatty
or Jellicoe was the hero or villain of Jutland; a tremendous amount has
been written on the subject. Yet the very disparity of the approach of
these two officers to naval warfare indicates a fundamental problem which
135

might have been solved by a thoroughly broacUgauge approach to the
problems of 20th century naval war when they arrived in the Fisher era.
Jellieoe was an officer of high talent in all fields who possessed the
complete confidence of his subordinates and superiors. He was a master
of his profession^ as well as a fine administrator, with an alert and
1?
precise mindo He was inclined to be cautious and a little pessimistic;
this appears early , even in some of his comments during the Naval Crisis
of 1909 o He fully understood the truth of what Churchill said of him:
"He was the only man who could lose the war in an afternoon «" This was
the philosophy behind the letter he wrote the Admiralty in late 191^,
setting forth his intent not to press an action if he believed there
was danger from submarines or mines
•
Beatty, on the other hand, was a most aggressive individual who
wanted only to get to grips with the enemy and believeu that this was
the only way to success* He was not thoughtless or reckless, as he
has sometimes been evaluated • His judgment and mentality were judged
most keen by many contemporaries, then and after the war as First Sea
Lord*
The point here is not the merits of these two officers e The point
is that almost the only view the two ever had in common, except of
course Jellicoe , s orders which Beatty was bound to follow when in
company, was a knowledge that column and long range were logical
fighting method! for modern ships
•
13
The Grand Fleet . The Crisis of the Naval War, and The Submarine
Peril are all quite depressing reading; some of the statements of
German capabilities are clearly exaggerated.
1-^6

This situation argues a lack of operational doctrine in the Royal
Navy of 191^ « The need foi such a doctrine , which guides the thoughts
and actions of officers of varying temperaments and coordinates them
without detailed instructions, was one of the lessons drawn from Jutland
by the U. S. Navy„ Commander Frost commented that if the destroyers at
the rear of the Giand Fleet line during the night encounter after
Jutland had been U. So, the result might have been different. He was
not casting an aspersion on the destroyer COs concerned, far from it.
He was commenting on the absence of a doctrine to guide but not rigidly
control their actions in such a situation© The Royal Navy view of
that day was that such matters were for the Admiral concerned. If he
chose to take the line that the battle required elaborate and detailed
orders, and close tactical control of every movement, as did JelUcoe,
he was at liberty to do so If he believed, as did Beatty, that loss
of ships was not vital if a decisive result was obtained, this was a
matter within his discretion.
A doctrine had existed in Nelson 1 s day„ His comments on "the
order of sailing is the order of battle" and "no captain can be very
wrong if he lays his vessel alongside that of the enemy" were an appli«
cation of a doctrine which required attack at all costs, and which had
court martlalled many officers for "failure to do their utmost to destroy
the enemy*" That doctrine was Sto Vincent 8 s creation in large part.
14
Frost, The Battle of Jutland .
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This is not to say that a cbetrine of a very aggressive type was
desirsbleo It is to say that if as much time and effort had been put
into developing a doctrine for use of the material produced in the Fisher
era as went into providing that material, the battle performance in World
War I would have been more uniform
To the writer, this situation is more explanatory of the variations
in performance and differences in method, as well as the lack of con-
fidence in, and impatience with, instructions from higher authority, than
any basic differences in personalities „ There may have been, as Marder
suggests, a lack of talent at the top of the list, but this seems less
important than the lack of doctrine to unite the thinking of this talent.
In studying any modern war, it must always be remembered that a difference
of 2 or 3 years in the date of outbreak would have changed the leadership
almost entirely©
It is perhaps unfair to lay this lack of a doctrine entirely on the
doorstep of the Fisher administration • However, a thoroughly comprehensive






The conclusions to be drawn from this study should of course be
those of the reader, looking at the rebuilding of a Navy as an operation
of managements Nevertheless, the writer has some opinions, both in the
areas in which the "Fisher Revolution" results were satisfactory or the
reverse and on the lessons which we may draw from this example*,
A G The Particular ,, The Royal Navy at the start of the revolution
was a quite centralized organization, once one passed from the indivi
ship level, especially in matters of administration, material and policy*
Fisher, as we have seen, centralized the control of the Admiralty in turn
so that it is correct to say that while there were many other individuals
concerned, the guiding and driving force was Fisher himself.
In Chapter XII, some of his personal characteristics were briefly
examined • It is perhaps helpful to consider his abilities and faults
in present day terms.
Obviously he had many strengths which add up to extraordinary ex-
ecutive ability • His mental capacity for detail was tremendous, coupled
with an exceptional skiU at selecting key ideas and fitting them to-
gether into a coherent whole*, He delegated detailed planning most
skillfully, getting the benefits of others abilities, yet retaining
control of the direction and result* Whatever the results of his methods
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of supervising and controlling the execution ©f plans were in human
tenuis, it cannot b« denied that the aehielements of this brief period
were immense—.his methods got results and commanded loyal support from
many. Those whose loyalty he could not win sufficiently to get results,
he was able to drive into producing results by sheer force of personality
He was skilled far beyond the age in the manipulation of the environment
outside the service to gain his ends c The degree of press, governments!
and public support he was able to gain for policies of the most radial
sort, has seldom been equalled. By the time he had lost this support to
a serious degree, the public demand was for more of the Navy he had been
able to build
•
For all his capacities, he does not give an impression of great
depth in thought. While he saw the strategic implications of the rise
of Germany, he did not develop his thoughts on the employment of the
instrument he built up enough to see all the implications of its use
in war. What is more important, when others brought forward opinions
which might have broadened or modified his thinking, if he could not
perceive the value of the opinions himself at once, he labelled them
as nonsense and refused to give them detailed consideration. This is
a product of his imr ense confidence in his own judgment. Strategy
was not his interests, Speculative projections of the future in detail,
weighing all factors, were not natural to his thought processes. The
results of these shortcomings were brought out in the discussion of
World War I at the beginning of this section and need not be detailed
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again* It is sufficient to say that some less than optimum features
of the Navy in that struggle can be traced to his administration.. It
must also be said in the same breath that the results, had he not
revolutionized the Navy, would have been far less goodo
His methods within the service were the most drastic shock the Navy
had received in a century. It is very likely true that drastic methods
and a tremendously forceful personality were essential to the results.
It is equally evident, that his periodic vindictive, suspicious, and
violent conduct was harmful to the Navy u • 00 »there was something about
him which goaded enmity to dementia oo* is a very valid and succinct
statement and not what one wishes to hear of a genuinely great man.
Winston Churchill has contributed a paragraph which seems a good statement
1
of the situation:
There is no doubt whatever that Fisher was right in nine-tenths of
what he fought for His great reforms sustained the power of the
Royal Navy at the most critical period in its history. He gave the
Navy the kind of shock which the British Army received at the time
of the South African War, After a long period o" serene and un-
challenged complacency, the mutter of distant thunder could be
heard. It was Fisher who hoisted the storm«signal and beat all
hands to quarters. He forced every department of the Naval
Service to review its position and question its own existence. He
shook them and beat them and cajoled them out of slumber into in-
tense activity. But the Navy was not a pleasant place while this
was going on, The •Band of Brothers* tradition which Nelson handed
down was for the time, but only for the time, discarded,
B, The Abstract , The Fisher era is an illustration of a distinction
of great importance to those responsible for organization, military or
otherwise. The distinction is between centralized decision making end
Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol, 1, pp, ?4«5; also quoted by
Marder, in Read to War,
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one man rule* There is a major difference between one man supported :
a staff ©f definitely subordinate technical experts, and a man supported
by a responsible staff capable of independent judgment and recommend a 1
There is no distinction between the ultimate responsibility for the c-
there is a very great distinction in the way it is reached I submit that
history (which Fisher called a record of exploded ideas) shows us the
overall superiority of th latter method u
A second important abstraction has to do with the drawbacks of
monolithic organization Monolithic organizations seem on charts, and
from a superficial view, highly desirable for efficiency o However,
difference of opinion or controversy is not permissible within the
monolithe Those of strong opposite views, which may be valid, feel unable
to make themselves heard within the monolith « They either do not do sc,
or do so from without. In either case, the benefit of their brains is
lost. It appears that disagreement must be organized for if we are to
avoid error and bitter controversy, both of which can only have a negative
effect in an organization which must have a common goal*
A third important abstraction has to do with the areas of human
relations and communication o Clearly, the negative results which marred
the achievements of the era can almost all be traced to failures of
communication in both directions, and to failure to utilize human relations,
rather than brute force, as a means of modifTing the conduct of others.
It seems very probable that better performance in these areas would have
improved the results of the Fisher Revolution: it is certain that the
negative results form an excellent example of the consequences of negl*~ +





It may be of interest that the Buckley Collection at the Naval
Postgraduate Schools while somewhat unsystematic in content, and
lacking the more modern standard works in the field, contains more
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Excerpted from The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone . Admiral of the
Fleet - Admiral Sir R, H. Bacon
"~
SYNOPSIS OF LORD FISHER'S CAREER
Early Years
Born ?5th January, 1841, at Rambodde, Ceylon. Son of Captain
William Fisher, 78th Highlanders and Sophia, daughter of A. Lambe.
Entered the Royal Navy, 13th June, 1854 Joined his first ship,
the VICTORY, at Portsmouth.
Served in the Russian War, in the Baltic in HMS CALCUTTA.
Served in the China War, I856-6O, including the capture of Canton
and the Peiho forts,,
I860 a 1872
Lieutenant, 4th November, I860.
3rd November 1866, was appointed to HMS EXCELLENT, gunnery
schoolship at Portsmouth (Captain Arthur W e A. Hood).
2nd August I869, promoted to Commander and appointed to the
China flagship.
1872 - 1881
19th September, 1872, was appointed to HMS EXCELLENT for torpedo
service • Started the VERNON as a torpedo schoolship • Visited Fiurae
to arrange for the purchase of the Whitehead torpedo.
20th October, 1874, promoted to Captain, and reappointed to EXCELENT
for torpedo service and instructional duties, remaining until 1876„
15th March, I877, appointed Flag~Captain to Admiral Sir A. Cooper-




18th January, 1881, appointed to command INFLEXIBLE, the largest
ship in the Navy
ship.
1883 - 1890
6th April, 1883, appointed to command of EXCELLENT gunnery school
-
lst November, 1886, appointed Director of Naval Ordnance, occupied
this post for four and a half years „ Carried out the transfer of Naval
ordnance and ordnance stores from War Office to the Admiralty o
2nd August, 1890, promoted to Rear=Admiral
21st May, 1891, appointed Admiral-Superintendent of Portsmouth
Dockyard Expedited the building of the ROYAL SOVEREIGN, the first
of a new type of battleship
•
1st February 1892, appointed Third Sea Lord and Controller of the
Navy,
8th May, I896, promoted Vice-Admiralo
24th August, 1897, hoisted his flag in RENOWN as Commander-in-Chief,
North American Station
»
In 1899» attended the first Hague Peace Conference as a Naval
Delegate,,
1899 - 1902
8th July, 1899* appointed Commander~in»Chief, Mediterranean Station.
2nd November, 1901, promoted Admiral
•
1902 - 1904
5th June, 1902, returned to the Admiralty as Second Sea Lord
remaining until 31st August, 1903
25th December, 1902, launched the new scheme of naval entry and
education of officers with training colleges at Osborne and Dartmouth
«
31st August, 1903, appointed Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth in




21st October, 1904, appointed First Sea Lord in Lord Selbome's
administration, On same date appointed First and Principal Naval
Aide-de-Camp to King Edward o
6th December 9 1904, Admiralty memorandum on the distribution of
the Fleet, introducing the nueleus~crew system for ships in reserve
and withdrawing obsolete craft from foreign stations <>
January 1905 » committee to inquire into the reorganization of the
Dockyards
•
6th March, 1905 » appointment of an Inspector of Target Practice,
10th February, 1906, launch of the DREADNOUGHT.,
November 1906, establl shaent of the Naval War College at Portsmouth.
January 1907, institution of a service of Fleet Auxiliaries -
ammunition and store ships, distillingj, hospital, fleet repair ships;
trawlers as mine=sweepers, etc etco
March 1907, creation of the Home Fleet, with DREADNOUGHT as flagship,
for service in the North Sea*
August 1907» new scheme of advancement of pay of naval ranks and
ratings introduced
o
September 1907, establishment of wireless telegraphy branch, and
installation erected on Admiralty building
•
25th January, 1910, retired from the office of First Sea Lordo
30th July, 1912, appointed Chairman of the Royal Commission on
oil fuel and oil engines for the Navy»
30th October, 1914, recalled to the Admiralty.
15th May, 1915» resignation as First Sea Lord.




The Committee on Designs1 and other notes on DREADNOUGHT
This was the most famous and probably the most "high priced" of Fisher's
many committees c It is probably the best example of his ability to get
men of every sort to work for him effectively when he wished to
Rear Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg - Director of Naval Intelligence
At this period the ONI had the
Rear Admiral Sir John Dvyston
Rear Admiral Ao Lo Winslow
Captain Henry A„ Jackson
Captain John R e Jellicoe
Captain Charles E c Madden
Captain R. H« S. Bacon
Phillip Watts
loiY: Kelvin










Controller - mentioned earlier,
responsible overall for the
design and construction of the
ships of the Navy
Director of Naval Ordnance
Naval Assistant to the Controller
Naval Assistant to First Sea Lord
(and latei first CO of DREADNOUGHT
)
Director of Naval Construction
The scientist and electrical
inventor His two specialties
were electrical and marine devices
University of Glasgow (Naval
Architect)
Shipbuilder {John I* Thornycroft 9
a design and building firm)
Fairfield Shipbuilding Company
(another leading shipbuilding firm)
Superintendent, Admiralty Ex-
perimental Works (one of the best
known naval architects of the r
"Froudes Ratio" still used in ship
design)
"Fisher Papers «, British Battleships, Warshl ps of "»forld War I,
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It is of record th^t the committee made extensive changes in the
origins! "Fisher Gayd'' sketch design, which involved 3 super- firing
turrets at each endo The committee was also advised by Charles A
Parsons, the inventor, and at the time the only builder. of turbine
machinery o The deliberations indicate that most of the discussions
had to do with gun arrangements and propulsion machinery., This is
logical since the ship size was determined by the armament (and
protection) and thereafter by the machinery which could produce the
required speed
It is also worthy of note that although DREADNOUGHT and INVINCIBLE
at about 20,000 were both considered monstrous ships in 1905» by 1912
the designed maximum displa cement had grown to 33»000 tons for the
battleships, (QUEEN ELIZABErH) and 35»000 for battle cruisers (TIGER),
In 1914, the Grand Fleet included 35 DREADNOUGHTS and 10 battle
cruisers: this is the derivation of Admiral Jameson's title, "The
Fleet that Jack Built o"
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